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A Constitutional and Ethical Evaluation of the U.S. Response to 
9/11 in OIF and OEF 
Garen Marshall 
ABSTRACT 
Terrorism, which is often politically motivated, is an intentional act or threat of 
violence against noncombatants that is performed with the aim of influencing the 
actions of a third group.  Governments may respond to such acts through the 
paradigm of war (which emphasizes killing or capturing enemy combatants) or the 
paradigm of crime (which emphasizes arresting and prosecuting perpetrators). In 
framing the nation’s geopolitical response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
Bush administration primarily applied the war model (through Operations Iraqi and 
Enduring Freedom: OIF and OEF) but also incorporated some elements of the crime 
paradigm.  In order to evaluate the administration’s use of these paradigms in the 
international response to 9/11, the war powers of the President are first analyzed 
through the lens of the U.S. Constitution and other relevant legal documents 
(including the Insurrection and Posse Comitatus Acts).  The analysis of this thesis first 
concludes that by responding to 9/11 through OEF and OIF, the Bush administration 
acted within the parameters of the Constitution.  As an additional method of 
evaluation, OEF and OIF are then analyzed according to principles of Just War Theory 
(jus ad bellum and jus in bello). Through this analysis, the thesis concludes that 
although OEF has been better than most previous wars, neither OIF nor OEF have 
been completely acceptable. 
 
THESIS STATEMENT 
The U.S. response to 9/11 in OIF and OEF has been constitutionally sound but not completely 
ethical according to a rights-based, just war analysis.   
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 At 8:46 a.m. on Tuesday September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed 
into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan.  As the U.S. came 
under the largest attack since Pearl Harbor, I sat across the Upper New York Bay in my 
eleventh-grade American History class trying to make sense of what had occurred.  We were 
locked in the classroom for several hours as the school’s administrators tried to figure out 
how to handle the situation.  By the time we were released I had already decided that I would 
join the military no matter where it would take me. 
 In March 2003, two days after my eighteenth birthday, I enlisted in the U.S. Navy and 
planned to become an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician.  After learning how to 
disarm every type of explosive device in existence, I quickly began deploying to the Middle 
East in support of the Bush administration’s War on Terror. 
My primary responsibility during my deployments to the Middle East was to disarm 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left by insurgents to kill civilians and coalition troops.  
An additional responsibility in my role as an EOD technician was to conduct post-blast 
analysis on sites of significant insurgent-performed attacks that had involved explosives.  In 
those cases I was to use my expertise in explosives to analyze what had happened at the 
scene, including making conjectures about who had performed the attack and by what means.  
On April 15, 2008 I was tasked with performing a post-blast analysis in Baquba, Iraq.  
When I arrived on the scene it turned out that a vehicle-borne IED had been driven into the 
center of a crowded marketplace filled with civilian men, women, and children.  In my 
investigation, I found that the attacker had been an Iraqi police officer who filled the trunk of 
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his police cruiser with explosives in order to kill as many civilians as possible, along with a 
couple of Iraqi soldiers.  Among the dead were a woman, her six-year-old daughter, and her 
five-year-old son.  A bus that had flipped over during the explosion (one of eight vehicles 
destroyed) landed on the mother and her daughter, most likely killing them instantly.  The 
boy, on the other hand, was not completely crushed so he lived long enough to spend his last 
few minutes looking at his dead mother and sister.  A few meters away, in the car directly 
behind the VBIED, the decapitated driver still held what remained of his arms aloft at the 
wheel. 
When I returned to base I was greatly disturbed.  Certainly, part of being deployed to 
a war zone is learning to detach your emotions from what is going on around you.  But when 
I thought about the children and all the people whose lives had been so brutally ended that 
day, I was at a loss for how a person could do such horrible things to innocent people.  I 
eventually began to question whether our presence in Iraq was even doing any good.  I had 
heard, at times, from several Iraqis, that they were better off after the American invasion.  
Yet I also wondered how many of the Iraqis (and Americans) who died in the war could have 
otherwise lived decent lives.  It seemed natural that I came to question the morality of the 
war in Iraq.  It is that questioning of the morality of war which was the impetus for this 
paper. 
 My original reason for joining the military was 9/11.  The enormity of the attacks 
made it seem clear from that day, that we would respond militarily.  At the time, everything 
seemed black and white.  But in retrospect, there were a lot of questions that should have 
been answered before we went to war: “Was 9/11 a crime or an act of war?”  “Was the Bush 
administration acting within their constitutional powers in deciding to go to war?”  And 
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finally, “Were the wars, as a response to 9/11, ethically justified?”  It is these questions that I 
will attempt to answer here.   
 In Section I of this paper, I will discuss what terrorism is.  Although identifying 
instances of terrorism may at first appear straightforward, competing definitions from key 
stakeholders complicate this process significantly.  In an effort to establish a shared 
definition for the remainder of the thesis I consider who it is that can perform acts of 
terrorism, who the intended targets are, and what the goals of terrorism must be.  In Section 
II, I will go on to describe the differences in methods for responding to acts of terrorism.  I 
will set up what will be described as the war and crime paradigms (the war paradigm having 
an emphasis on killing or capturing enemy combatants, and the crime paradigm having an 
emphasis on arresting and prosecuting perpetrators). 
 In Section III I begin to analyze the Bush administration’s choice to go to war in 
response to 9/11.  I begin this investigation by evaluating what powers the Constitution, the 
Insurrection and Posse Comitatus Acts, and presidential signing statements give the President 
in choosing how to respond to acts of terrorism.  Additionally, I review recent and past case 
law to explain what powers the President has in choosing to prosecute enemy combatants 
once they are captured.   
 Finally, in Section IV, I will put forward a moral evaluation of the decision to go to 
war in Iraq and Afghanistan.  By building on the groundwork of just war theorists, such as 
Michael Walzer, I further develop a moral theory intended to ensure that actions in war 
recognize the individual rights of human beings.   Through the lens of this rights-based, just 






The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as: 
 
The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful 
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate 
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are 
generally political, religious, or ideological.1 
 
In contrast, the U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as: 
 
Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience.2 
 
Surprisingly, it seems that the definitions provided by these two organizations are vastly 
different.  The State Department definition is much more specific in limiting who terrorist 
attacks are perpetrated against (noncombatants) as well as who they are perpetrated by.  The 
Department of Defense, on the other hand, references the particular groups (governments and 
societies) that terrorism is intended to influence.  This divergence in the defining of terrorism 
amongst our governmental organizations is just one of many examples.  Of course, if this 
were only an issue of semantics it would not be a major problem, but unfortunately, the 
ability of national and international organizations to successfully combat terrorism relies, in 
part, on a common understanding of what is and what is not an act of terrorism.   
 One of the major difficulties in defining terrorism is that the term’s usage has 
changed with time.  The term “terrorism” was originated during the latter part of the French 
                                                        
1 United States. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Instruction Number 2000.18. 
2002. www.dtic.mil. Department of Defense. Web. 25 Oct. 2010. 
2 "Patterns of Global Terrorism." U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, 30 Apr. 2001. Web. 25 Oct. 2010.  
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Revolution.  The régime de la terreur described the governmental use of mass executions to 
silence opposition to the newly formed revolutionary government.  For a short time la 
terreur enjoyed a reasonably positive connotation, since it was seen as needed to maintain 
order.  Before long, however, the reach of la terreur grew too large and the revolutionary 
leader who had argued for the virtue of governmental terrorism (Maximilien Robespierre) 
was executed, transforming “terrorism” into the pejorative term it is considered to be today.3   
 Although terrorism was used at times to describe the tactics of non-governmental 
revolutionary and anarchistic groups in the 19th century, the early to mid 20th century led to a 
shift back to terrorism as a description of state-based actions (those of Italy, Germany, and 
Russia).  It wasn’t until after WWII that terrorism came to be a description of decidedly non-
state based actions.  Whether as a result of the fine-tuned rhetoric of nations in the post-war 
world or due to the change in tactics of governmental and non-governmental groups, it seems 
that terrorism, as a description of non-state based actions has remained in common use 
through to today. 
 In defining terrorism, then, the first consideration should be who it is that can perform 
an act of terrorism.  In his book, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, Igor Primoratz claims 
that an act of terrorism must have “the aim of intimidating some other people [than those 
attacked] into a course of action they would otherwise not take”4 (this being a major point of 
distinction between terrorism and murder).  Certainly it seems that this sort of action is not 
dependant on the identity of the person or group performing it.  In fact, some of the most 
historically significant acts of violence have taken exactly this form, for example, the 
                                                        
3 Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia UP, 2006. Print. Page 4. 
4 Primoratz, Igor. Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004. Print. Page 6. 
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American atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as the British “area bombings” 
of German cities in WWII.5  In both of these instances the primary goal of the attackers was 
not to slaughter thousands of civilians but to break the will of the opposing military forces 
and governments, thereby pressuring those governments to surrender.  Yet, since much of 
today’s discourse on the topic of terrorism seems to restrict that label to actions performed 
by non-state entities (as is the case in the U.S. Department of Defense definition),6 further 
specification on the criteria required for a terrorist attack is needed. 
 In the U.S. State Department’s definition of terrorism (referenced above), the identity 
of the victim is offered as a defining feature.  According to the State Department, a terrorist 
attack is “perpetrated against noncombatant targets.”  In further explanation, the State 
Department defines “noncombatants” as “civilians (or) military personnel who at the time of 
the incident are unarmed or not on duty.”7  The idea that there is a difference between attacks 
on combatant and non-combatant targets is a moral distinction. The common view of 
“terrorism” as a pejorative term combined with the idea that attacks on combatants are the 
only type that can be legitimate8 is likely the reason that terrorism has been restricted to 
attacks on noncombatants.  Accordingly, when Iraqi insurgents attack a combatant U.S. 
                                                        
5 Primoratz 141. 
6 (When referring to acts of this nature performed by states, many laymen as well as the 
media will not refer to such acts simply as terrorism but will qualify the acts as state 
terrorism or will not call them terrorism at all). For examples of the use of the term “state 
terrorism,” see "US Has Endorsed Indian State Terrorism in Occupied Kashmir." Pakistan 
Patriot. 10 Nov. 2010. Web. 11 Nov. 2010. ; "State Terrorism Stays on Having Thrown out 
Tamil Terrorism It Spawned." Sri Lanka Guardian. 2 Nov. 2010. Web. 11 Nov. 2010. 
7 "Patterns of Global Terrorism." U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, 30 Apr. 2001. Web. 25 Oct. 2010.  
8 Orend, Brian. "War." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. 4 Feb. 
2000. Web. 01 Oct. 2010. 
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military convoy in Iraq it is an act of war, but when they attack civilians in a crowded 
marketplace, it may be (although not necessarily) an act of terrorism. 
 In response to the U.S. Department of State’s definition of “noncombatants” as 
“civilians (or) military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty” 
it must be pointed out that their classification of some military personnel as noncombatants is 
far too over inclusive.  Although this will be discussed in much further detail in Section IV, 
there is a significant moral distinction between civilians and all military personnel in the 
rights that they enjoy.   By becoming a combatant one sacrifices some rights that a civilian 
does not and so whether military personnel are actively participating in hostilities is 
inconsequential to whether they are in the same class as civilians.  As pointed out by Rutgers 
University Professor of Philosophy, Jeff McMahan, “It is therefore because combatants pose 
a threat to others that they are legitimate targets of attack; and it is because noncombatants 
threaten no one that they are not legitimate targets.”9  This being said, the U.S. Department 
of State’s restriction on acts of terrorism to those perpetrated against noncombatants is 
acceptable, but those noncombatants are exclusively civilian.  Moreover, this does not imply 
that it is never wrong to kill a combatant; just that killing a combatant is not constitutive of 
an act of terrorism. 
 In discussing the distinctions between the killing of combatants and noncombatants it 
must, furthermore, be pointed out that some people reject the distinction completely.  On one 
side of the argument, there are those who believe that attacks on combatants are just as 
                                                        
9 McMahan, Jeff. "An Ethical Perspective on Child Soldiers." Child Soldiers in the Age of 
Fractured States. By Simon Reich and Scott Gates. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 
2009. 29. Print. 
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morally impermissible as attacks on noncombatants.10  Yet, there is a strong argument to be 
made for the moral rights of people to defend themselves, their property, and those around 
them against attacks by others.  In fact, in many cases it seems as though there is a moral 
duty to do so.  If we are to say that it cannot be morally acceptable to attack combatants, we 
are left with a level of pacifism that is counter to the commonly accepted views of Just War 
Theory (which will be discussed in further detail in Section IV).11  Whether from a Kantian, 
Utilitarian, or Just War perspective, there seem to be significant justifications for the view 
that it is at least sometimes permissible to attack combatants.   
 On the other side of the debate, there are those who claim that it is not only morally 
acceptable to attack combatants but that in some circumstances it is permissible to attack 
those who support them (e.g., by being members of a democracy).  Although many earlier 
terrorist groups believed that civilians should be free from attack,12 with time this view was 
abandoned; most noticeably in the late 20th century.  Noah Feldman outlined the growing 
inclusiveness of acceptable targets of violence (from the view of radical-Muslim terrorists) in 
a speech entitled, “Past & Future in the Middle East: 7 Years Since 9/11”: the attack on the 
U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut was justified because those present (although not involved in 
active combat) were “military occupiers.”  In Arab-Israeli conflicts, women became 
acceptable targets since they were serving in the military.  Eventually, attacks on American 
civilians were accepted, since democracy means that everyone is involved (although the 
                                                        
10 Fiala, Andrew. "Pacifism." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. 
2010. Web. 24 Oct. 2010. 
11 Orend 
12 For example, the Russian group Narodnaya Volya claimed that, “‘not one drop of 
superfluous blood’ should be shed in pursuit of aims, however noble or utilitarian they might 
be.”  See Hoffman 6. 
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deaths of children pose a particular problem for this assertion).13  It seems, thought, that this 
growing inclusiveness of morally acceptable targets is a problem for the distinction between 
the rights of combatants and noncombatants.   
Because they do not directly participate in hostilities, civilians are illegitimate objects 
of attack.  As humans we, in some sense, enjoy a right to life.  This right to life should be 
understood not only as Thomas Hobbes understood it, as being a right to protect one’s own 
life, but as implying a corresponding duty on others not to interfere with one’s ability to 
continue living.14  However (as will be discussed in much greater detail in Section IV), by 
becoming combatants some people sacrifice their rights to life, which is why they are the 
only people considered legitimate targets of attack.  Since combatants lack a full right to life, 
others also have a diminished duty to not interfere with the combatant’s right to life.  This 
means that there is a duty not to kill civilians but that there is either a much more limited or 
even no duty at all not to kill combatants.  For this reason, the argument that it is morally 
acceptable to attack noncombatants should be discarded.    
 So to clarify, thus far the criteria for an act of terrorism are that it be performed with 
the aim of influencing the actions of a group other than the one attacked and that the victims 
of the attack be noncombatants.  These criteria seem to be satisfying in as far as they allow 
attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing and the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa to be 
considered acts of terrorism.  However, we are still left with the issue of who it is that can 
perform acts of terrorism.  Although it is clear that non-state entities (e.g., Al Qaeda, FARC, 
                                                        
13 Feldman, Noah. “Past & Future in the Middle East: 7 Years Since 9/11.” 92 Street YMCA, 
NYC. 11 Sep. 2008. 
14 Hobbes, Thomas. "XV Of Other Laws of Nature." Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & 
Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill. McMaster University Archive of the 
History of Economic Thought. 88-92.  
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etc…) may perform acts of terrorism, the criteria stated thus far leave the door open to the 
idea that states can also perform acts of terrorism.  Clearly, this requires further investigation 
since so much of the common discourse seems to restrict the label of “terrorism” to non-state 
actions. 
At first glance it may seem that actions that satisfy the aforementioned criteria are 
morally worse when performed by non-state actors.  However, this view is most likely the 
product of life in a country where non-state actors have performed the most notorious 
attacks.  In reality, it seems that these actions, when performed by states, not only lack moral 
superiority (compared to those actions when performed by non-state actors), but that, as 
pointed out by Igor Primoratz, they are often morally worse for at least four reasons: 
• State based terrorism is typically performed on a much larger scale. 
• State based terrorism usually involves secrecy, deception, and 
hypocrisy [of course, the same may be said about actions performed 
by non-state actors but it, in some sense, seems worse when it is our 
own government deceiving us]. 
• State based terrorism violates international human right declarations 
or conventions and agreements the states sign on to. 
• States cannot say they have no alternative, for the most part.15 
 
Accordingly, many philosophers and political scientists alike have made the argument that 
“states as well as non-state groups can engage in terrorism.”16  Yet, if state and non-state 
actors alike may perform acts of terrorism, there must be some explanation for why the term 
“terrorism” is so often used as referring exclusively to the actions of non-state actors.  I 
would attribute this discrepancy to the ability of states to control the dialogue of terrorism. 
 In The Semantics of Terrorism, Edward Herman claims, “Terrorism is mainly 
an instrument of the strong, who have the resources to terrorise, a frequent interest in using 
                                                        
15 Primoratz 117. 
16 Held, Virginia. "Terrorism and War." The Journal of Ethics 8.1 (2004): 59-75. Print. 
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terror to keep opponents of their rule under control, and the cultural power to define 
terrorism to exclude themselves and pin the label on their enemies and targets [italics 
added].”17  Although it is not completely clear that terrorism is primarily carried out by the 
“strong” (since it seems most acts of terrorism are very small attacks), Herman’s observation 
that those with cultural power label others as terrorists explains the common usage of the 
term.  As it is clear that state action may constitute terrorism, it is the ability of states to 
categorize non-state actors as terrorists that has driven mainstream terminology.  Obviously 
it is advantageous to have your enemy labeled as a terrorist, while being immune to such a 
classification for similar, if not more horrendous actions.  
One pervasive, yet unsuccessful method of countering the ability of strong actors to 
label others as terrorists, which must be addressed, is making the claim that “one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”  For example:   
Speaker A:  “The 9/11 hijackers were clearly terrorists.”  
Speaker B: “Well, that’s not necessarily true.  You know, one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”   
 
Of course, speaker A’s statement is clearly consistent with the criteria of terrorism discussed 
thus far, but how can this make sense if, as speaker B points out, some people may have seen 
the hijackers as “freedom fighters?”  It seems the issue here is really that speaker B’s 
argument is based on a faulty assumption.  When speaker B replies in this conversation, the 
argument he/she is really making is that “Some people may have seen the hijackers as 
freedom fighters.  Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that the hijackers may be objectively 
labeled as terrorists.”  It seems though that in making this claim, speaker B is assuming that 
                                                        
17 Herman, Edward Sherry. "The Semantics of Terrorism." World Dialogue. Center for 
World Dialogue, 2000. Web. 08 Nov. 2010.  
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someone cannot be both a freedom fighter and a terrorist, which is certainly not true.  A 
terrorist, by definition is someone who commits acts of terrorism.  A freedom fighter is 
someone who fights for the goal of freedom.  In comparing the two, labeling someone a 
terrorist describes the tactics they use, while labeling someone a freedom fighter describes 
their ultimate goal.  So, when speaker B claims that some people see the 9/11 hijackers as 
freedom fighters this is perfectly consistent with the obvious fact that the hijackers were 
simultaneously terrorists.  As speaker B’s claim will run into the same problem in every 
instance, it is insufficient to counter the labeling ability of strong actors (i.e., states).  It 
seems clear, then, that powerful actors will continue to control the mainstream dialogue of 
terrorism.  Fortunately, despite the ability of these actors to control the dialogue, it is fairly 
clear that there is no reason why some state actions cannot be considered terrorism.   
Recognizing that  “terrorism” should not be restricted to describing only non-state actions 
leaves the growing definition of terrorism as an act of violence against noncombatants (in 
accordance with the State Department definition of noncombatant), performed with the aim 
of influencing the actions of a third group.   
Another issue that must be addressed is that the U.S. Department of Defense includes 
threats of violence in their definition.  As Sherry Colb points out, “Threats can…sometimes 
accomplish more than physical violence can, and when the "accomplishment" is destructive 
rather than benign, it might be fair to characterize the threat as "worse" at some level than the 
violence.”18  Yet, the fact that the effects of threats may be just as bad as those of actual 
violence is not the reason why the Department of Defense is correct in including some 
                                                        
18 Colb, Sherry. "Threats Versus Physical Violence." Dorf on Law. 04 Feb. 2010. Web. 25 
Oct. 2010. <http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/02/threats-versus-physical-violence.html>. 
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threats of violence in their definition.  At the core of terrorism is the way in which terror 
influences the group that is not attacked.  If, for example, a group which has been known to 
carry out bombings in the past threatened to attack shopping malls throughout the U.S., the 
fear they intend to generate in shoppers and the effect they intend this threat to have on the 
government are just as constitutive of terrorism as if they had carried out the attacks.  Of 
course, having not carried out the attacks is a significant mitigating factor, but the threat has 
still attained the aim of influencing a third group through terror, which is most certainly the 
essence of terrorism.  Accordingly, the definition of terrorism must be expanded to include 
not only acts of violence but threats of violence as well.  This adjustment will leave the 
definition of terrorism as an act or threat of violence against noncombatants, performed with 
the aim of influencing the actions of a third group.   
Another aspect of both the Department of Defense and State Department definitions 
of terrorism is that they refer to terrorist acts as being “premeditated” or “calculated.”  The 
reason for this is most likely to establish that these acts involve a certain level of intent.  
Although it may be the case that many attacks are, in fact, thought out to the level that these 
agencies have specified, premeditation or calculation (i.e., planning the attack ahead of time 
as opposed to it being more spontaneous) cannot be considered necessary to reach the level 
of intent involved in terrorism.  Although it is certainly necessary that an act of terrorism 
involve intent, the idea that an act of terrorism must be premeditated or calculated is too high 
a standard.  One can clearly imagine an act of violence that someone carries out because the 
attacker has built up a sense of anger or frustration and has simply had an opportunity 
presented to him or her.  For example, someone who is frustrated with poor service provided 
by the local bussing company may decide, while riding on the bus, to attack the driver, 
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intentionally causing him to steer the bus off of a cliff and killing all of the passengers. 
Although this act could have been performed with absolutely no prior planning or 
forethought (for example, the attacker could have become particularly frustrated while riding 
on the bus and spontaneously decided it was the appropriate time for such an attack), few, if 
any would deny that it is an act of terrorism.  
A lower standard of intent which is still sufficient to constitute an act of terrorism is 
similar to that called for by the mens rea requirement in most common law systems.19  In 
order for someone to be found guilty of a crime, it is necessary (in most instances) that the 
prosecution establish the mental culpability of the defendant.  In order for such culpability to 
be established, there are two factors that must be satisfied.  First, the act must be voluntary.  
In other words, the person performing the act must have been able to do otherwise.  If this 
standard were applied to terrorism, the implication would be that an act of terrorism could 
not be caused by factors outside the perpetrator’s control.  For example, if someone 
somehow tripped and fell off of a building, thereby killing several bystanders below, the 
involuntary nature of his actions would preclude the act from being an act of murder.  On a 
side note, coercion (e.g., a threat of death unless an action is performed) does not make an 
action involuntary.  Although coercion may be considered a mitigating factor for committing 
an act of terrorism, such an act cannot be considered involuntary.  Someone who carries out a 
coerced act could do otherwise (than perform the act), he just decides it would be in his or 
someone else’s best interests that he completes the act as demanded.   
                                                        
19 Sayre, Francis B. "Mens Rea." Harvard Law Review 45.6 (1932): 974-1026. JSTOR. Web. 
24 Oct. 2010. 
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The second factor that is necessary in establishing intent is that the actor be aware or 
should have been aware of the likely outcome of his actions.   If someone, for example, is 
tricked into detonating an explosive device (say, the trigger mechanism for an explosive 
device is actuated by turning on a light switch, and the person in question was asked to turn 
that light switch on), he cannot be considered responsible for an act of terrorism, since he 
neither knew or should have known what the likely outcome of his actions would be.  Of 
course, in an instance like this, the only person who can be said to have carried out an act of 
terrorism would be whoever set up the explosive device in the first place.  Therefore, with 
these two factors of intent understood (and after discarding the governmental terminology, 
since “premeditated” or “calculated” are each too high a standard), the newest formulation of 
the definition of terrorism is an intentional act or threat of violence against noncombatants, 
performed with the aim of influencing the actions of a third group.  
A final consideration in the defining of terrorism is whether these acts must be, as 
Bruce Hoffman puts it, “ineluctably political in aims and motives.”20  In agreement with 
Hoffman, Robert Gilpin uses 9/11 as just one example of how “terrorism in all its many 
manifestations is a form of political action carried out to achieve specific political 
objectives.”21  Although it is clear that 9/11 was politically motivated (Osama Bin Laden has 
long called for the restoration of the Caliphate as well as the expulsion of Westerners from 
Muslim lands), it does seem theoretically possible that an act of terrorism could have a non-
political goal.  To clarify, politically aimed terrorism would be those acts intended to have an 
effect on either governmental or social policy.  For example, the attacks on the US embassies 
                                                        
20 Hoffman 40. 
21 Gilpin, Robert. "War Is Too Important to Be Left to Ideological Amateurs." International 
Relations 19.1 (2005): 5-18. Print 
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in Kenya and Tanzania were political because the attackers intended to change US 
governmental policy.  On the other hand, the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan, pervasive 
throughout the South during Reconstruction, was political as a result of its aim of changing 
social policy.  One example of terrorism that may not be political would be an attack on a 
local shopkeeper by the mafia in order to intimidate other shopkeepers into paying a monthly 
fee. This sort of non-political terrorism has been described as having a “conscious design to 
create and maintain a high degree of fear for coercive purposes, but the end is individual or 
collective gain rather than the achievement of a political objective.”22  So, while it may be 
true that most forms of terrorism are political, it seems theoretically possible that there may 
be non-political forms of terrorism as well.  This will leave the final version of the definition 
of terrorism as an intentional act or threat of violence against noncombatants, which is often 
politically motivated, and is performed with the aim of influencing the actions of a third 
group. 
 As it is now relatively clear what is and what is not an act of terrorism, it will be 
much easier to examine the ways in which terrorism can be dealt with and to evaluate the 
U.S. response to 9/11.  In section II, as I discuss the two paradigms through which terrorism 
may be addressed I will narrow the scope of my focus to the most salient and problematic 
form of terrorism throughout the United States: radical-Islamic terrorism performed by non-
state actors.  For simplicity, when referring to “terrorism” throughout the rest of the paper, it 
is this specific form of terrorism that I will be discussing.  
 
                                                        
22 United States. Department of Justice. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals. Disorders and Terrorism. 1976. Print. 
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II 
Crime vs. War 
 
One of the central questions in any counterterrorism strategy is whether terrorism 
should be handled as war or crime.  Choosing one paradigm over another will have major 
consequences. The acceptable use of force, the protection of rights, and the sort of justice 
sought varies greatly with each.  With the attacks of September 11th, 2001, serving as the 
most effective terrorist attacks in modern history (of those performed by non-state actors), 
these two paradigms each offer a distinct and critically important range of options in 
responding to and preventing future attacks.  What responding to terrorism through either of 
these paradigms entails will be the focus of this section.  
At least until recent times, the distinction between crimes (which violate domestic 
law) and acts of war (which have typically been considered a challenge to the attacked state’s 
sovereignty) has been seen as relatively clear.  These traditional distinctions have been based 
around four criteria that are outlined by Bemis Professor of International Law at Harvard 
Law School, Noah Feldman, in his essay, “Choices of Law, Choices of War”: identity, 
provenance, intent, and scale.23 
The identity criterion is, perhaps, the simplest traditional distinction between war and 
crime.  This is the idea that states, immune from domestic law, can only carry out acts of 
war, not crime, when attacking other states.  Conversely, non-state actors lack such immunity 
from domestic law, and so their acts of aggression are considered criminal in nature.  This 
criterion, of course, is dependant on the supposition that the only true law is domestic in 
                                                        
23 Feldman, Noah. "CHOICES OF LAW, CHOICES OF WAR." Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 25.2 (2002): 457. Academic Search Complete. EBSCO. Web. 09 Jul. 2010. 
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nature, and that there is a global state of anarchy.  Therefore, the existence of global 
institutions of law, such as the International Court of Justice, poses a problem for such a 
belief. 
The provenance criterion refers to the jurisdictional provenance of states.  This 
criterion requires that crimes occur only within the areas in which states are considered to 
have legal jurisdiction.  This provenance is, however, relatively vast, since it includes 
“actions within its [the state’s] borders (even if taken outside the borders); actions against its 
nationals, even nationals abroad under some circumstances; and actions taken outside the 
state that are directed against the security of the state.”24  On the other hand, acts of war are 
typically considered as being committed from outside the provenance of the attacked state, 
even though the attacks themselves may occur within that provenance.  Hence, the states 
usually refrain from making laws against attacks performed on them by other states.  These 
acts of war are seen as being beyond the grasp of domestic law, making them distinct from 
the crimes of non-state actors performed within the state’s legal jurisdictions. 
The third criterion, that of intent, refers to the purpose of the attackers as a point of 
distinction between war and crime.  In acts of crime, it is claimed, that the perpetrators act 
within the legal framework of the state.  Their intent is to commit their act (which they are 
usually aware is a violation of domestic law) and evade capture, prosecution, and 
punishment.  In contrast, the intent of an actor in an act of war is not to similarly evade legal 
sanctions, but to challenge the system of the attacked state itself.  In other words, the 
criminal acts within the legal system, while the warrior acts from without.  Of course, war 
                                                        
24 Feldman. 
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crimes are troublesome for the intent criterion, but they are just one of several issues faced 
by these traditional criteria. 
Finally, the scale criterion places war and crime on a continuum of force.  The 
difference between war and crime, it is claimed, is that war is noticeably larger.  This means 
that a particularly small act of aggression is not an act of war, despite the identity of the 
attacker.  Likewise, a massive attack performed either by a state or some non-state entity is 
an act of war.  In the past this criterion would most often have led to the same line being 
drawn as the identity criterion (i.e., state actions as war and non-state actions as crime).  
Today, however, the rise of technology has made it possible for these two criteria to have 
different outcomes.  9/11 serves as the perfect example of how massive attacks are no longer 
isolated within the domain of state action.  This means that although the scale criterion 
would label 9/11 as an act of war, the identity criterion would label the attacks as criminal.  
Acts like 9/11 are not the only ones that cause problems for the stability of the four 
criteria.  As Feldman points out, other difficulties arise when trying to classify acts of 
treason, rebellion, civil disobedience, and (as mentioned earlier) war crimes.25  For example, 
cases of civil disobedience, when understood through the identity criterion, are certainly 
instances of crime.  The intent criterion, however, would possibly label certain acts of civil 
disobedience as war, since they may be performed with the intent of challenging the 
sovereignty of the state.  A particularly large act of civil disobedience may be considered war 
under the scale criterion, and yet the provenance criterion would label civil disobedience as 
crime.  Although there are many actions that may be easily identified as falling into either 
the war or crime paradigms, the few borderline cases that exist may pose some serious 
                                                        
25 Feldman. 
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problems.  Most recently, the blurred distinction between crime and war has become a major 
issue in dealing with terrorism.  Beginning with 9/11, the US response to terrorism, which 
was greatly affected by choosing between these paradigms, has had a major effect on many 
countries around the world. That said, it is extremely important to consider the implications 
of confronting terrorism from either a crime or war paradigm. 
 
Significance of the Crime/War Distinction: Kill/Capture or Arrest/Prosecute. 
One of the most important differences between the paradigms of war and crime is 
how choosing one over the other affects the morality of causing harm to certain individuals 
(in war those individuals are combatants and in crime they are suspects).  In war, the aim in 
pursuing a combatant is to deny him the ability to perform an attack (whether he would 
actually take part in an attack or just contribute to the ability of the enemy forces to perform 
attacks).  This being the case, it is usually considered acceptable for soldiers to kill the 
targeted individuals on sight.  The only instance in which a soldier is prohibited from killing 
a targeted individual (assuming the soldier’s orders have not precluded the use of deadly 
force) is when that individual is either attempting to surrender and/or is incapacitated.26  In 
the event that the targeted individual does surrender or becomes incapacitated, the soldier’s 
responsibility shifts from killing to capturing them.  The captured individual will then be 
held as a prisoner of war until the conclusion of hostilities, at which point he will be released 
(assuming that he has not committed crimes against the law of war, i.e., war crimes). 
                                                        
26 Roth, Kenneth. "The Law of War in the War on Terror." Foreign Affairs 83.1 (2004): 2-7. 
Academic Search Complete. EBSCO. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. 
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When acting within the paradigm of crime, the law enforcer (typically, police) is 
responsible for a much more non-violent approach.  As opposed to the soldier’s immediate 
objective of killing or capturing their target, the law enforcer’s immediate focus is on 
apprehension.  Force should be used only as a last resort, and even then the force should be 
kept to a minimum (hence, the use of nightsticks, pepper spray, and tasers as alternatives to 
pistols, rifles, and shotguns).  In fact, it seems that the use of force by law enforcers is 
acceptable not for its utility in serving the objective of apprehension, but for its necessity in 
circumstances where the enforcers or bystanders are facing “an imminent threat of death or 
serious bodily injury.”27 
In addition to the differences as far as the appropriate times for the use of force, the 
rules of war and the rules of law enforcement find different levels of “collateral damage” to 
be acceptable.  As Baruch College Professor Douglas P. Lackey explains, in war 
“noncombatants can be legitimately killed if their killing is an unavoidable side effect of 
military operation aimed at some legitimate effect and is proportionate to the importance of 
that effect.”28  This Doctrine of Double Effect is a readily accepted part of Just War 
Theory.29  No such standard exists for law enforcement.  As evidenced by hostage situations 
in which police will spend hours on end trying to negotiate with criminals, it is seen as 
                                                        
27 Roth 2. 
28 Lackey, Douglas P. "The Good Soldier versus the Good Cop: Counterterrorism as Police 
Work." The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2006): 66-82. Print. 
29 McIntyre, Alison. "Doctrine of Double Effect." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
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completely unacceptable in police work to take actions that are likely to cause injury to 
noncombatants.30 
Another difference between the paradigms of war and crime is what is intended to be 
the final disposition of those who are captured or apprehended.  In war, the final release of 
those who are captured is not only thought to be acceptable but is required.  As called for in 
Article 118 of the Geneva Conventions, “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated 
without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”31  In instances of crime, after they are 
apprehended, the suspects (who in the United States are not considered guilty until they are 
convicted) are prosecuted.  If they are convicted, they are punished for their actions.  This 
punishment, depending on the circumstances of the crime as well as the laws in the venue of 
the trial, may include death.  This point of distinction is the only one in which the use of 
force is heightened on the law enforcement side.  So in war, the targeted individual may be 
killed up until the point of capture and then must be released at the end of hostilities 
(assuming he has not violated any conventions of international law).  In instances of crime, 
the law enforcer must try to avoid killing the perpetrator, but after apprehension and 
conviction it is possible that killing will become acceptable.   
One other major distinction between the paradigms of crime and war is the use of 
military tribunals or commissions in cases of war (based on the powers granted to Congress 
                                                        
30 For an example of one recent stand-off see: Robbins, Liz, and Brian Stelter. "Maryland 
Hostages Safe as Police Kill Gunman." New York Times. New York Times, 01 Sept. 2010. 
Web. 18 Nov. 2010. 
31 "International Humanitarian Law - Third 1949 Geneva Convention." International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - Home. International Committee of the Red Cross. Web. 
14 Nov. 2010. 
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in Article I of the United States Constitution)32 and civilian trials (based on the powers 
granted to the Judiciary in Article III of the Constitution)33 in cases of crime.  In war, 
assuming that there have been no “Offenses against the Law of Nations,”34 all captured 
enemy combatants are released at the cessation of hostilities.  However, when enemy 
combatants are accused of violating these laws (e.g., the Geneva Conventions), Article I of 
the U.S. Constitution allows that they be brought before a military commission and tried as 
war criminals.  As defendants under these commissions, enemy combatants do not typically 
enjoy the full array of rights reserved to those facing trial in Article III (civilian) courts.  
Among the rights that defendants in such instances may be denied are the rights to a jury 
trial, indictment, due process, and counsel, as well as protection against self-incrimination.  
Military commissions will often have more inclusive evidentiary rules (e.g., sometimes 
allowing hearsay and coerced confessions) that tend to work against the defendant.35  
Although these military commissions have most often been limited to use against non-
citizens, they have been used against U.S. citizens as well.36   
To summarize, the differences between using a war or crime paradigm are as follows:   
 
 
                                                        
32 "The Constitution of the United States," Article 1, Section 8, § 9 & 10 
33 U.S. Const. art. III 
34 U.S. Const. art. I, sect. 7, § 10   
35 United States. Cong. Terrorism and the Law of War Trying Terrorists as War Criminals 
before Military Commissions. By Jennifer Elsea. Cong. Rept. RL31191. [Washington, D.C.]: 
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36 For examples see Ex parte Quirin Et Al. Supreme Court of the United States. 29 Oct. 1942. 
LexisNexis Academic. Web. 22 Nov. 2010. ; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Supreme Court of the 
United States. 28 June 2004. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 23 Nov. 2010. 
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War Rules:  
1. Soldiers are primarily responsible for stopping enemy combatants 
from committing or contributing to any further hostile actions.   
2. Soldiers may kill enemy combatants as long as those individuals are 
neither surrendering nor incapacitated.   
3. The doctrine of necessity and the Rule of Double Effect allow 
soldiers to cause substantial collateral damage, including deaths of 
civilians, if such destruction is considered a military necessity and if 
the deaths of those civilians are not the primary intention of the 
attack.   
4. Once an enemy combatant is captured, soldiers must respect the 
rights of the captured enemy.  The captured enemy may be detained 
until the end of hostilities, at which point all prisoners of war who 
are not being prosecuted for war crimes by a military commission 
must be released.  
5. If an enemy combatant is found to have committed a war crime, he 
may be prosecuted as part of a military commission as allowed by 




1. The primary responsibility of law enforcers is the apprehension of 
suspects. 
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2. Force should be used only as a last resort.  When force is used, it is 
not for the goal of mission success, but to protect the endangered 
well-being of law enforcers and innocent bystanders.   
3. Once a suspect is apprehended, if a sufficient amount of evidence is 
produced, he will undergo criminal proceedings outlined in Article 
III of the United States Constitution.   
4. Although defendants will not always enjoy the full array of 
constitutional protections (depending on their citizenship or 
immigration status),37 they will almost always enjoy a greater array 
of rights than those guaranteed to defendants in military 
commissions. 
 
Pros and Cons of Each Paradigm 
 Both the crime and war paradigms have distinct advantages and disadvantages.  In 
crime, the primary advantage is that procedures protect suspects’ rights and help to ensure 
that only the guilty are punished.  The rights of those accused are held to be just as important 
as the interests of the state.  This emphasis on rights means that “We make the effort to 
think through responsibility, we make the effort of proving that responsibility beyond a 
certain standard, and then we think about issuing a punishment.”38  Although it is 
possible that a person may be wrongfully convicted of a crime and executed, the 
possibility of an innocent person being killed in pursuit of justice is far less likely when 
                                                        
37 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988). 
38 Feldman, Noah. “Past & Future in the Middle East: 7 Years Since 9/11.” 92 Street YMCA, 
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using a crime paradigm, especially since the doctrine of necessity is not seen as 
acceptable.  This inapplicability of the doctrine of necessity as well as the requirement 
of more universal rights protections in criminal proceedings means that the crime 
paradigm has more of an emphasis on human rights than that guaranteed by the 
paradigm of war.  In addition, the satisfaction of justice that may be attained in a well-
conducted criminal prosecution will rarely, if ever, be reached in actions following the 
paradigm of war.  
 The benefits of using a war paradigm, on the other hand, spring from the more 
loosely required protections of human rights that are often identified as the cons of 
such a strategy.  First and foremost, the allowance of force under the rules of war means 
targeted individuals will rarely be able to carry out any further attacks once identified 
and located by military forces.  In law enforcement, the perpetrator is sometimes 
allowed to get away if it means pursuit may endanger bystanders.39  In contrast, war 
rules mean that the pursuit of such individuals will be carried on, to varying extents, 
even if at times that entails harming innocent bystanders.   
Another benefit of using the war paradigm is that the level of success in 
preventing enemy combatants from carrying out future attacks is bolstered by the fact 
that, for the sake of the mission, soldiers do not have to be as worried about protecting 
the rights of bystanders or of those targeted.  This makes going after such individuals in 
a war paradigm much easier, since soldiers are unconstrained by many of the obstacles 
that stand in the way of routine police work.  These constraints, when applicable, as in 
                                                        
39 For an example of one a stop-pursuit policy see "After 4 Deaths, Milwaukee Police Pursuit 
Policy Changed." Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. 29 Mar. 2010. Web. 24 Nov. 2010. 
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the paradigm of crime may mean that targeted individuals will more often be able to 
escape, and even if captured may end up being freed as a result of rights violations 
committed by law enforcers.  Even more importantly, high standards of evidence 
required in a criminal paradigm may be extremely difficult if not impossible to satisfy 
when dealing with incidents or perpetrators located outside the confines of the United 
States and its territories.    
Finally, when using a crime paradigm, insufficient evidence will mean that 
suspects have to be released.  In instances where these suspects are actually dangerous 
to society, their release may pose a significant threat.  In contrast, the rules of war allow 
that enemy combatants be held until the cessation of hostilities.  Being able to hold 
these combatants for this period of time entails that a lack of evidence will not lead to 
their early release and continued threat to society.  However, the fact that these 
individuals do have to be released at the end of hostilities (assuming, once again, that 
they have not committed war crimes) may leave them free to conduct further acts of 
violence in the future, a problem that is not found in the crime paradigm, since 
punishment for particularly heinous crimes may lead to sentences of life imprisonment.  
Furthermore, since enemy combatants have become harder to distinguish from civilians 
(as has been the case in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom), 
the war paradigm leaves open the possibility that civilians will be captured by mistake, 
and held for an indefinite period of time, a risk to human rights the crime paradigm 




Choosing War In Response to 9/11 
 Beginning with the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. has been forced to 
reorganize its response to and planning for terrorist attacks.  The attacks left the question 
open as to whether they were criminal actions or acts of war.  On one side of the argument 
were those who claimed that, in accordance with the scale criterion, the sheer size of the 
attacks constituted an act of war.  In opposition, there were many who claimed that despite 
the scale of the attacks, the fact that they were carried out by members of a non-
governmental organization meant the actions were criminal in nature.   
By choosing to go to war in Afghanistan and later is Iraq the Bush Administartion 
largely chose a war paradigm (at least internationally).  Additionally, the U.S. response has 
included, to some extent, elements of the crime paradigm.  With those decisions behind us 
we can now evaluate whether they were acceptable.  One way of analyzing the Bush 
administration’s decisions is to consider whether the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the 
U.S. offer guidance in choosing a paradigm.  Whether the choices made by the Bush 











Constitutional/Legal Powers and Restrictions On 
Choosing a Model 
  
In evaluating the Bush administration’s response to 9/11 through the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, it makes sense to begin by examining the powers given to and the 
restrictions placed upon the government by the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States.  As discussed earlier, use of the war (kill/capture) paradigm usually involves more 
infringement on liberty and human rights.  It is safe to say, then, that if there were 
Constitutional/legal restrictions on the ability of the government to choose a paradigm, most 
of those limitations would be placed upon choosing a war paradigm.  Yet, as will be 
discussed in this section, the entire body of laws in the United States leaves the President 
nearly free to do as he pleases with the military, especially overseas.  Additionally, the 
President and Congress face very few restrictions when it comes to the use of military 
commissions to prosecute those involved in terrorism and wars against the United States.   
The Constitution splits the responsibilities of war and defense between the legislative 
and executive branches.  Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution outlines congressional war 
powers: 
§1. The Congress shall have the power to…provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;40 
 
§9. To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;41  
 
§10. To Define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on 
the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;42 
                                                        
40 U.S. Const. art. I, sect. 1, § 1 
41U.S. Const. art. I, sect. 1,  §9 
42 U.S. Const. art. I, sect. 1, §10 
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§11. To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and 
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;43 
 
§12. To raise and support Armies…;44 
 
§13. To provide and maintain a Navy;45 
 
§14. To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the 
land and naval Forces;46 
 
It is obvious from reading these statements that the war powers granted to the Congress in 
the Constitution are vast.  The Congress is, here, given the powers not only to set the budget 
for the military, but also to regulate the military, to declare war, to set up military tribunals, 
and to prosecute those who violate the “Law of Nations” (i.e., war criminals).  Article II, 
Section 1 outlines the war powers of the Executive, which are not quite so broad: 
 
§1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States;47 
 
As the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy it is also understood that the President 
has the power to lead the Marine Corps (since it is a department of the Navy) and the Air 
Force (which did not come into existence until well into the 20th Century).  Also, the 
President is responsible for ensuring that the laws are faithfully executed.   
 On the face of these Articles, it appears that the war powers granted to the legislature 
heavily outweigh those of the executive.  However, it has historically been the case that the 
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47 U.S. Const. art. II, sect. 1, §1 
 33 
President has played a dominant role in taking on and conducting conflicts that follow war 
rules.  In recognition of this fact, the Congress attempted to reign in presidential power by 
passing the War Powers Act of 1973 toward the end of American involvement in Vietnam. 48  
As the nation grew more dissatisfied with the ongoing Vietnam War, the legislative branch 
began to look into how it could constitutionally limit the power of Presidents to involve 
American forces in future conflicts without congressional support.  They turned to the 
“necessary and proper clause” of the Constitution. 
 Article I, Section 8, §18 declares that the Congress shall have the power “To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department of Officer therof.”49  The legislature took this statement to mean that it had 
the authority to make any laws that were needed to enforce its constitutionally enumerated 
powers over the military and the conduct of war, even if this meant encroaching upon the 
powers the executive believed he possessed.   
In passing the War Powers Act, the Congress explicitly stated that the purpose of the 
act was to ensure that the legislature, as well as the executive, would share responsibility for 
deploying troops in support of hostile actions and for deciding upon their continued 
deployment as such campaigns are carried on.50   In order for this to be the case, the act 
explains first that there are only three situations under which a President, acting as 
Commander-in-Chief, may deploy troops: there is a declaration of war (made by the 
legislature), the legislature makes a law specifically authorizing the use of military force, or 
                                                        
48 50 U.SC. § 1541-1548. 1973. 
49 U.S. Const. art. I, sect. 1, §18  
50 50 U.SC. § 1541(a). 1973. 
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there is “a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or 
possessions, or its armed forces.”51  The act (which was vetoed by President Nixon and 
eventually passed over his veto52) attempts to further limit presidential power by setting out 
several other requirements in instances where troops are deployed in support of combat 
operations (or operations that are likely to involve hostilities) with neither a formal 
declaration of war (which the U.S. has not made since World War II) nor a law being passed 
to authorize such actions.  First, the act requires that the President provide a written report to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
within forty-eight hours of deploying troops.53  This report must outline the President’s 
reasons for the deployment as well as the projected end of the hostilities. In addition, 
following the initial report, the President is required to periodically (and upon request) 
provide updated reports. 
A second, more heavy-handed restriction on presidential power called for by the War 
Powers Act is that the President may only deploy troops for sixty days in the previously 
mentioned circumstances unless the legislature declares war, extends the allowance of 
deployment for an additional sixty days, or is unable to meet as a result of ongoing 
hostilities.54  Additionally, the President is allowed thirty days to bring the troops home if the 
allowable deployment period is not extended, leaving the President with the ability to deploy 
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American troops anywhere in the world without congressional approval for a total of ninety 
days. 
 It must be recognized that even with the War Powers Act in place, presidential power 
to use the military is vast.  First, the War Powers Act does not provide any means to ensure 
that the President follows its requirements.  Although the legislature could, theoretically, cut 
off funding for any war effort, it seems unlikely that it would do so.  The President, as the 
most highly visible political figure in the U.S., could easily cast members of the legislature 
as being against the troops or weak on defense if such funding were restricted (two 
possibilities which could be devastating to congressmen and senators when it comes time for 
reelection).  Additionally, the power to deploy American troops for ninety days gives the 
President the ability to respond to terrorist actions, within war rules, anywhere in the world.  
Finally, it must be recognized that when it comes to responding to acts of terrorism or 
protecting the U.S. against what appear to be threats to U.S. security, the legislature often 
seems to go along with Presidential decision making.  For example, since the introduction of 
the War Powers Act, the Congress has passed specific laws to allow the deployment of 
troops in Lebanon,55 Somalia,56 Panama,57 Iraq in 199158 and 2002,59 as well as anywhere in 
the world in the Authorization for use of military force against those responsible for attacks 
launched against United States on Sept. 11, 2001, which was passed only seven days after 
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9/11.60  In addition, the legislature often passes resolutions in response to presidential actions 
in war that do nothing more than voice its disapproval as opposed to taking actions that will 
actually have an effect on presidential policies.  One example was House Concurrent 
Resolution (HCR) 63, which the House of Representatives passed and the Senate concurred 
with in 2007.61  HCR 63 was passed to show opposition to President Bush’s surge of 20,000 
troops in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  However, as a nonbinding resolution, HCR 63 
did nothing to change the policy, and the surge was carried out.  Of course, the legislature 
could have cut the funding necessary for the surge, which would have made it impossible to 
carry out.  
This track record seems to show that although the Congress at times has attempted to 
hamper the war powers of the President, it has often been compliant and even supportive of 
his use of the military for combat operations.  The combined power of the legislative and 
executive branches has made it the case that the government has often and repeatedly turned 
to American hard power and war rules as a way of resolving conflicts with other nations and 
non-governmental organizations.  The War Powers Act, however, is not the only legal hurdle 
that the executive branch has to deal with when choosing a war (kill/capture) paradigm.   
Another set of restrictions on the U.S. government when it comes to using war rules 
for fighting terrorism are international conventions.  Although the President is legally bound 
by the U.N. Charter, Article 51 allows that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
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maintain international peace and security.”62  With ongoing terrorist threats and attempted 
attacks against the U.S. and its allies, it seems clear that this statement would prevent the 
U.N. from standing in the way of U.S. actions to fight terrorism.  The other major 
international security agreement the U.S. is a part of is the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  When President George W. Bush feared he would not receive 
backing for using war rules in Iraq (three out of five permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council were against attacking: China, Russia, and France), he turned to his NATO 
allies for support.  Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads as follows: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with 
the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of 
the North Atlantic area. 
 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof 
shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has 
taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain 
international peace and security.63 
     
The wording in both the U.N. Charter and the NATO Treaty clearly explain that nations 
involved have the right to defend themselves against foreign threats.  In the case of Iraq, 
however, the threat was not so clear.  The Bush administration went to great lengths to try to 
make connections between Iraq and 9/11.  When that seemed to fall through, the 
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administration claimed the threat posed was from Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons 
of mass destruction (which also came to naught).   Yet, there has been no major international 
backlash against the U.S.  It seems, then, that the ability of the U.S. to choose war paradigms 
(even when it may not be justified) is not really constrained by either NATO or the U.N.  
Although there are sometimes self-imposed restraints placed upon the U.S. when it comes to 
international charters (these self-imposed restraints, discussed later in this section, mostly 
apply to the use of military commissions), it seems that neither the American Constitution 
and American laws nor international institutions and laws can prevent the President and 
Congress from using war rules in the pursuit of terrorists.  The only other restriction on the 
use of a kill/capture (war rules) paradigm seems to be posed against the use of the military in 
pursuing terrorists within the United States by the Posse Commitatus Act.  
 The Posse Comitatus Act was passed on June 18, 1878, and has been revised several 
times since.64  Its original enactment came towards the end of the Reconstruction era, in 
which the military had continued to occupy the southern states after the northern victory in 
the Civil War.  Although at its inception the Act referred only to the Army it was later 
updated to include the Air Force.  The entire text of the Act, as updated in 1956, reads as 
follows: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses 
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus65 or 
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.66  
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As a result of its vague wording, it has mainly been through later court cases and additional 
laws that restrictions on the use of the military put forward by the Posse Comitatus Act have 
become clear.   
 Even before the passing of the Posse Comitatus Act, the Insurrection Act of 1807 
authorized the President to use the military on property of the states (the Posse Comitatus 
Act does not apply to federal land) to suppress “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful 
combination, or conspiracy” when he felt it was necessary.67  Further stipulations require that 
the state in which the Insurrection Act is applied be unable to suppress the insurrection and 
that the President get the consent of either the governor of the state or its legislature.68  The 
fact that the Insurrection Act was not repealed at the signing of the Posse Comitatus Act 
meant that the Insurrection Act outlined instances in which the military could still be used to 
enforce the law domestically.  Presidents used the military under the Insurrection Act several 
times in the 20th century: President Eisenhower sent troops to Little Rock, Arkansas69 to 
attempt to uphold court ordered desegregation,70 President Kennedy sent troops to Alabama71 
and Mississippi72 in response to opposition to desegregation, and President George H.W. 
Bush deployed troops to quell riots in Los Angeles.73  
 Besides those provided by the Insurrection Act, there are several other exceptions to 
the Posse Comitatus Act.  First, the Posse Comitatus Act does not prohibit use of the Coast 
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Guard, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security as opposed to the Department 
of Defense.  Although the Act, in and of itself, does not apply to the Navy, the Department of 
Defense has applied the constraints of Posse Comitatus to the Navy as a matter of 
Department of Defense policy.74  However, courts have found that the Navy may be used 
domestically to assist the Coast Guard in its duties.75  In fact, courts have additionally found 
that the military may participate in most domestic law enforcement activities as long as its 
role is passive and not active,76 prohibiting such active law enforcement activities as 
“…arrest, seizure of evidence, search of person, search of building, investigation of crime, 
interviewing witnesses, pursuit of escaped civilian prisoners, search of area for suspects and 
other like activities.”77   Nonetheless, later congressional legislation has allowed the military 
to have what appear to be very active roles in drug interdiction and immigration control.78  
One example of the impact such legislation has had may be found in the case of People v. 
Wells,79 in which a court decided that military personnel may act as “undercover informants” 
in sting operations without violating the Posse Comitatus Act.  Despite this clear erosion of 
the Act, the government has in recent years gone even further in undermining its purpose. 
 Since the Posse Comitatus Act is a law as opposed to an amendment to the 
Constitution, subsequent laws can change its provisions with only a majority vote in the 
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Congress.  The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200780 
included a small provision that authorized the President to use the military and National 
Guard to restore order in cases of natural disaster, epidemic or other public health 
emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or domestic violence, or other condition.81  The only 
restriction placed on the President in doing so is that he notifies the Congress within fourteen 
days.  The implication of the Act was that the President no longer needed to get the 
permission of a state’s governor when he thought troops should be used in accordance with 
the Insurrection Act.  This shift in power which left the choice of whether to use the military 
within the U.S. (under certain circumstances) completely up to the President quickly had 
major implications.   
Not long after the John Warner Act was passed, President Bush had the 3rd Infantry’s 
1st Brigade Combat Team assigned to United States Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM).82  With its headquarters located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, 
“USNORTHCOM conducts homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation to 
defend and secure the United States and its interests.”83  Although USNORTHCOM has been 
in existence since 2002 (it was created partly in response to the attacks of 9/11), the 
assignment of the 1st BCT marked the first time since the Civil War that active duty military 
personnel were given full-time responsibilities for homeland defense within the United 
States.  The USNORTHCOM website lists its specific mission responsibilities as including 
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response to natural disasters, drug interdiction, and terrorist attacks involving weapons of 
mass destruction.84  It was not long, however, until members of Congress noticed the 
implications of the John Warner Act. 
One of the most outspoken opponents of the John Warner Act was Senator Patrick 
Leahy (D-VT).  According to the Senator, section 1076 of the John Warner Act  
…‘subverts solid, longstanding posse comitatus statutes 
that limit the military’s involvement in law enforcement, 
thereby making it easier for the president to declare martial law.  
The changes to the Insurrection Act will allow the president to 
use the military, including the National Guard, to carry out law 
enforcement activities without the consent of a governor.’85  
 
Eventually Senator Leahy, along with Senator Kit Bond (R-MO) managed to get the changes 
made to the Insurrection Act repealed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2008.86  However, the President had one more tool to help ensure that his newfound 
power over the military was not revoked. 
 If President Bush had vetoed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008 (and had the Congress not overridden his veto) it would have done away with the entire 
bill, as opposed to the specific provisions he wanted to remove.  In 1996 the Congress passed 
a law allowing Presidents to perform what are referred to as line-item vetoes.87  As opposed 
to the traditional veto, line-item vetoes gave the President the power to veto specific 
provisions of a bill and sign the rest into law, greatly speeding up the law making process.  
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However, in 1998 the Supreme Court of the United States, in Clinton v. City of New York,88 
found the line-item veto law to be unconstitutional because it gave the president a type of 
law making power (through his ability to amend laws) that the Constitution did not allow.  
This would seem to imply that if a President were unhappy with a proposed law, as written, 
he would either have to veto the entire bill or sign it into law as is.  Yet, that is not the case.  
When President Bush signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 he 
included the following statement: 
 
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2008 January 28, 2008 
 
 Today, I have signed into law H.R. 4986, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. The Act 
authorizes funding for the defense of the United States and its 
interests abroad, for military construction, and for national 
security-related energy programs.   
 Provisions of the Act, including sections 841, 846, 1079, and 
1222, purport to impose requirements that could inhibit the 
President’s ability to carry out his constitutional obligations to 
take care that the laws be faith- fully executed, to protect 
national security, to supervise the executive branch, and to exe- 
cute his authority as Commander in Chief. The executive branch 
shall construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the 
constitutional authority of the President.89 
 
Called a signing statement, a short blurb like this is basically a back-door version of a line-
item veto.  Although they are nothing new, they have only come into common usage in 
recent times.  The first presidential signing statement was issued during the Monroe 
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administration.90  Between the time of the Monroe and the Reagan administrations, they were 
rarely used, and when they were it was most often for their most uncontroversial purpose, 
clarification of wording in a law.   
 Presidential signing statements have three functions.  First, they may be used to 
clarify the president’s interpretation of ambiguous parts of a bill.  Second, they may be used 
to pose Constitutional/legal objections to a portion of a bill.  Finally, the statements may be 
used to notify members of the Executive branch of how they are to interpret parts of a bill or 
to disregard portions of a bill the President believes to be unconstitutional.  In the past, the 
majority of signing statements were issued with the first purpose in mind: clarification.  Yet, 
with the most recent Bush administration, a large majority, nearly eight out of every ten 
signing statements specifically challenged the constitutionality of provisions of bills that 
were signed into law.91  This was a major change over President Clinton, who only posed 
constitutional objections in 18% or 70 out of 381 signing statements.92  This change in 
direction for signing statements in the Bush administration was a sign that the President’s 
power to respond as he sees fit has been greatly expanded in recent years.  The more than 
1,000 provisions labeled as unconstitutional by President Bush included not only the repeal 
of the John Warner Act, but also a provision limiting presidential power in the USA 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 200593, and the McCain Amendment in 
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the Detainee Treatment Act94 which “prohibited the use of torture, or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment of prisoners.”95  
 With the use of presidential signing statements becoming common practice, future 
and current presidents may find it even easier to use the military as they see fit when 
combating terrorism.  In addition, any measure put forward by Congress (short of a 
constitutional amendment) to reign in the power of the President can be overridden by more 
signing statements.  Although these statements may not be in line with the intent of our 
founding fathers, the Constitution seems to lack any opposition to their use.  Yet, even if the 
Supreme Court should eventually restrict the use of presidential signing statements,96 it is 
clear that between the war powers given to the Congress and President through Articles I and 
II of the Constitution, respectively; the weakness inherent in the Posse Comitatus Act, and 
the lack of binding strength in international charters, that the U.S. government is 
constitutionally and legally free to choose a war (kill/capture) paradigm in the fight against 
terrorism.  The next question to explore, then, is whether the government has the same 
constitutional/legal freedom in deciding between prosecuting terrorists as war criminals 
under military tribunals and prosecuting terrorists as civilian criminals in courts called for by 
Article III of the Constitution. 
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Judicial Interference in the Use of Military Tribunals. 
 Although the roles of the executive & legislative branches seem at times to conflict, 
what is clear is that the framers of the Constitution intended that both branches serve a major 
role when it comes to the use of the military and ensuring the safety of the American people.  
The same cannot necessarily be said when it comes to the judicial branch.  Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution does not explicitly give the judicial branch any power over the military, 
nor does it state that the Supreme Court has the ability to control the actions of the other 
branches.  Yet, since Justice Marshall’s 1803 ruling in Marbury v. Madison it has been 
recognized that the Supreme Court, through the power of judicial review, can rule 
congressional and executive actions to be unconstitutional.  Although the power of judicial 
review is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, it has posed what seem to be the most 
significant restrictions on presidential and legislative decisions to use military tribunals for 
trying terrorists. 
 One of the first Presidents to have his actions during wartime brought before the 
Supreme Court was Abraham Lincoln.  In 1863, James L. Vallandigham, a member of the 
House of Representatives from Ohio, was arrested for violating General Order No. 38.97  The 
order, which was issued by General Ambrose Burnside, made it a crime to speak out against 
the Northern military effort or the Lincoln administration.  Vallandigham was charged with 
doing both in a speech he gave criticizing Lincoln’s actions in the Civil War.  His charges 
read as follows: 
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Publicly expressing, in violation of General Orders No. 38, from 
Head-quarters Department of Ohio, sympathy for those in arms 
against the Government of the United States, and declaring 
disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of 
weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to 
suppress an unlawful rebellion.98 
 
 Vallandigham was brought before a military commission and convicted of violating 
General Order No. 38.  He was sentenced to spend the duration of the war as a prisoner in 
Fort Warren but President Lincoln commuted his sentence and had Vallandigham sent to 
Tennessee, since it was beyond the Northern military lines.99  Vallandigham subsequently 
filed with the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari as an attempt to challenge his conviction 
by the military commission.  The Supreme Court, however, denied Vallandigham’s petition 
and decided that they did not have jurisdiction over the military commission.100  The Court’s 
decision left Lincoln with the power to use military commissions throughout the duration of 
the war, unobstructed by judicial interference.  Yet, it was not long after the end of the Civil 
War (and Lincoln’s assassination) that the Supreme Court made a decision, in Ex parte 
Milligan, which greatly diverged from their position in the Vallandigham case.  
 Lambdan P. Milligan, who was an Indiana resident, was sentenced to be hanged by a 
military commission in 1864.101  Although not a member of the military, Milligan was 
convicted by a military tribunal of having planned to aid the Confederate war effort.   
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Following his conviction, Milligan applied to the Indiana Circuit Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 A writ of habeas corpus is a court order demanding that the government produce an 
imprisoned person for the court so that the court may decide whether the prisoner is being 
held lawfully.  Although the right to request such writs is not explicitly contained in the 
Constitution, Article I contains a prohibition against suspending habeas corpus rights unless 
certain circumstances exist: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.”102  
In order to aid the war effort in the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended the right to 
habeas corpus so that citizens who opposed the North could be imprisoned without court 
interference.103  In 1861 Lincoln’s ability to suspend the right of habeas corpus was 
challenged in Ex parte Merryman.104  Although the Merryman Court decided that Lincoln 
could not suspend the right, the decision was ignored (until the end of the war) and 
Merryman, who was imprisoned, was not produced.105  It was the fact that Lambdan Milligan 
waited until the end of the Civil War to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, which made it 
possible for the Court to hear his case. 
 In Ex parte Milligan the Supreme Court overruled Milligan’s conviction by a military 
commission.  Although the Court did not challenge the President’s ability to suspend habeas 
corpus rights during wartime, it decided that military commissions could not try American 
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citizens where Article III courts are fully functional.106107  Brushing previous court rulings 
off as having been made in error as a result of “the temper of the times,” the Supreme Court 
also ruled that military tribunals could only be used for civilians as a last resort, when no one 
other than the military can handle the trials.108  The strong stance of the Court in Milligan 
was a far cry from the earlier court decisions around the time of the Civil War.  This strong 
stance, though, would not remain set in stone as the issue of military commissions would 
once again be brought before the Supreme Court seventy-six years later in Ex parte Quirin.  
 Once again at war, the U.S. government made use of military commissions in 1942.  
Ex parte Quirin involved eight German saboteurs who had ridden a German submarine to the 
eastern coast of the United States.109   Once they reached the shore the eight men, who had 
been carrying “explosives, fuses, and incendiary and timing devices,” removed their 
uniforms.  They were subsequently apprehended by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and 
tried before a military commission for violating “the law of war and the Articles of War, 10 
U.S.C.S. §§ 1471-1593.”110  Despite the fact that one of the saboteurs was an American 
citizen, all eight were sentenced to death.  The saboteurs then petitioned the Supreme Court 
for a writ of habeas corpus and subsequently for a writ of certiorari, both of which were 
granted. 
 In their argument to the Supreme Court, the saboteurs claimed that their fifth and 
sixth amendment rights had been violated: the rights to due process and trial by jury, 
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respectively.  The saboteurs also claimed that they could not be labeled as enemy belligerents 
(which was necessary to their being tried by a military commission) since they had not 
carried out their plans.  Finally, the saboteurs cited the decision in Ex parte Milligan to show 
that the Court had previously forbade the use of military commissions, particularly of 
American citizens, (as one of the defendants, Herbert Haupt, was in this case) when civilian 
courts were functioning properly.    
In response to the claims of the saboteurs, the Supreme Court first explained that the 
rights provided by the fifth and sixth amendments did not preclude the use of military 
commissions (which could exclude these rights) for violations of the laws of war.  The Court 
also decided that whether the saboteurs had been successful in completing their goals was 
irrelevant since they had removed their uniforms within the United States (violating the laws 
of war) in order to carry out their plans.  Finally, the Court responded to the citation of Ex 
parte Milligan.  Although it seemed that Haupt’s situation was analogous to that of Milligan 
(they both intended to assist an enemy force in damaging the ability of the U.S. military), the 
Court found that the holding in Ex parte Milligan did not apply to the situation in Ex parte 
Quirin.  According to Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, “Milligan, not being a part of or 
associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law 
of war save as -- in circumstances found not there to be present, and not involved here -- 
martial law might be constitutionally established.”111  In other words, Milligan was not 
closely associated with enemy forces to the extent that he could be labeled as an enemy 
belligerent and tried by a military commission.  Although Chief Justice Stone refrained from 
setting out exact instructions on when an American citizen can and cannot be labeled an 
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enemy belligerent, he made it clear that Haupt fell within the former category.112  Six of the 
eight men were executed in 1942, with the other two having their death sentences commuted 
by President Roosevelt, to thirty years for one and life in prison for the other.113  The 
decision by the Court in Ex parte Quirin gave the President much more leeway to use 
military commissions in the future, and signaled a stepping back of the Court from the strong 
posture it took in Ex parte Milligan. 
Not long after Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court made decisions in Korematsu v. 
United States (1944) and Johnson v. Eisenstrager (1950), both of which further bolstered the 
power of the President in times where national security seemed to be at risk.  In Korematsu 
v. United States, Justice Black decided that it was constitutional for the President to relocate 
persons of Japanese decent on the West Coast to internment camps during World War II.  In 
Johnson v. Eisenstrager, the court decided that it had no jurisdiction over German war 
criminals held by the American military overseas.  This left the President free, once again, to 
use military commissions without interference from the Supreme Court.  Even without the 
use of military commissions, though, the executive branch has strong powers to try those 
who are not American citizens (which constitute a large portion of those accused of terrorist 
activities) before Article III courts, since several court decisions have shown that non-
citizens do not enjoy the full range of constitutional protections guaranteed to citizens. 
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In 1990 the Supreme Court heard U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez.114  Urquidez was a 
Mexican citizen brought to the United States on drug-related charges.  The U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency, with the consent of Mexican authorities had searched the Urquidez 
residence in Mexico without a search warrant.  At trial, Urquidez claimed that the evidence 
collected during the DEA’s investigation was inadmissible, since the fourth amendment bars 
unreasonable search and seizure.  In his decision, Justice Rehnquist explained that the 
wording of the Bill of Rights, in some sections, specifically refers to “the people” as those to 
whom certain rights apply.  According to Justice Rehnquist, it would seem that "the people" 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom 
rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”115  His decision in 
this case implied that not only are those who are labeled as enemy belligerents allowed to be 
tried before military tribunals with limited rights, but that those people who are not part of 
the American “community” may be tried by Article III courts without the full array of 
Constitutional rights as well.  Indeed, it was only two years later that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
decided in US v. Alvarez-Machain that those who were accused of violating American laws 
could be tried within the United States no matter how they came to be here, even if that 
included (as it did in the Machain case) forcible abduction.116 
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It seemed clear, then, that well into the 1990s the ability of the executive branch to try 
enemy belligerents (including American citizens) and those who were not part of the 
American community was largely unopposed by the courts.  Military tribunals could try 
enemy belligerents, while only allowing them to enjoy limited rights.  Those who were not 
enemy belligerents yet could still be cast as outside the American community (and some 
strong arguments have been made that those who participate in terrorist activities remove 
themselves from the American community117) could be tried in Article III courts with limited 
rights as well.  To most American citizens, these issues did not seem particularly salient.  In 
more recent times, however, the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror have 
brought these issues to the forefront.  A series of cases following 9/11 has brought further 
investigation into what resistance courts will may pose to decisions of the President and 
national security/law enforcement officials in trying those believed to be involved in terrorist 
activities. 
In June, 2004, the Supreme Court rendered decisions in two cases, Rasul v. Bush118 
and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,119 which may have been the strongest stands the Court has made 
against a President’s power to limit habeas corpus rights since Ex Part Milligan.  Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld concerned an American citizen, Yaser Hamdi, who was captured by American 
forces fighting in Afghanistan.  Detained as an “enemy combatant,” he was to be held until 
the end of hostilities in the War on Terror as was authorized by Congress’s Authorization for 
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Use of Military Force.120  Although the Court in Hamdi recognized that it was well within 
the power of the President (when authorized by Congress) to hold enemy combatants 
throughout the duration of hostilities, it decided that detainees must be given the opportunity 
to challenge the designation before a neutral decision maker as part of their right to due 
process.121  According to James Wilson Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of 
Law, Robert J. Pushaw Jr., “Hamdi represented the first time the Court had ever recognized 
that Congress authorized a presidential war power, yet had struck it down as 
unconstitutional.”122  As Pushaw explains in his article “Creating Legal Rights For Suspected 
Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?”123 the Court’s decision 
was most likely the result of several circumstances arising around the time of Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld.   
As the only unelected branch of the federal government, the judiciary is inherently 
undemocratic.  In order to balance this with the idea of America as a “government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people,”124 the Supreme Court must be careful to choose 
its battles with the other branches carefully.  Although we do have a system of checks and 
balances, judicial review tends to make the court look political.  This is why, as Pushaw 
points out, the Supreme Court is most likely to interfere with congressional and presidential 
actions in reference to national security issues when (i) the severity of the threat has 
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diminished, (ii) the support of Congress for the President has waned, (iii) the severity of 
intrusion on individual rights is high, and (iv) the political strength of the President is low.125  
All of these factors seemed to have come into play at the time of Ex parte Milligan and they 
were also coming into effect around the time of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: It had been several 
years since 9/11, President Bush’s approval rating had begun to dip below 50%,126 and it 
seemed possible that those detained in the War on Terror could be held permanently.127  The 
only factor that was not fulfilled was the waning in congressional support, but along with 
Bush’s approval ratings, it would have seemed likely at the time that Bush would lose 
Republican seats in the House of Representatives and Senate in the 2006 mid-term elections.   
On the same day that the Supreme Court released its decision on the Hamdi case, it 
also rendered its decision in Rasul v. Bush.128  Rasul v. Bush concerned four non-American 
detainees in the War on Terror who were being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  The 
detainees petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, which the government 
claimed they could not do since they were neither American citizens nor were they being 
held in an area under U.S. sovereignty.  Nonetheless, Justice Stevens decided that the Court 
did have jurisdiction over the detainees and that habeas corpus rights were not limited to 
American citizens.129  Rasul, like Hamdi, was a major blow to the efforts of the Bush 
administration in battling terrorism.  Yet, following the loss of Republican control of the 
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House of Representatives and the Senate in 2006, the weakened President would still have 
two more cases in which the Supreme Court stood in defiance. 
In response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul and Hamdi, the Department of 
Defense created Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT), which gave detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay the opportunity to challenge their designation as enemy combatants.130  
Additionally, the Congress issued the Military Commissions Act of 2006131 which 
“authorized and formalized the creation and use of military commissions for [trying those 
designated as enemy combatants].”132  Still the Court became even bolder in 2006 with the 
case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.133   
When another detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Salim Hamdan, was designated as an 
enemy combatant (in accordance with the standards required in the CSRT), he filed for a writ 
of habeas corpus.  Although the writ was granted by a district court and then denied by the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court quickly granted Hamdan’s petition.  
The Court decided to hear the case despite the fact that Congress “then enacted DTA section 
1005(e) (1), which provided that as of December 30, 2005, ‘no court, justice, or judge’ had 
jurisdiction to consider habeas actions by alien detainees at Guantanamo.”134  In its decision, 
the Court explained that the particular military tribunal was illegal because it had violated 
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both the Geneva Convention and the Uniformed Code of Military Justice.135  Although this 
decision did not completely ban the use of military commissions it did require that different 
procedures be used when prosecuting detainees at Guantanamo Bay.   
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Congress 
passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, part of which explicitly gave the President 
power to continue trying enemy combatants before military commissions.136  However, the 
Supreme Court, once again, restricted this power by ruling in Boumedine v. Bush, that the 
portion of the Act that authorized the commissions violated habeas corpus rights protected by 
the Constitution.  This decision was later followed by another Act authorizing executive use 
of military commissions: the Military Commissions Act of 2009.137  Although the Act still 
allows the use of military commissions for trying enemy combatants, it outlines the rules for 
the commissions as being much closer to those rules applied in Article III courts, making it 
more likely that the rights of those prosecuted will be protected.  This once again means that 
the executive branch can continue trying those captured or arrested for acts of terrorism 
under either military commissions or Article III trials.  What the future holds for Supreme 
Court interference is not completely clear, but in order to avoid being drawn further into the 
political realm, the Court will most likely keep a lower profile when it comes to these matters 
in the near future.  It also remains to be seen what the President’s next steps will be in 
dealing with those held at Guantanamo, since the first high-profile trials of detainees are only 
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really beginning to take place now.138  What can be said is that if the current political 
situation changes (e.g., a President comes into power with a higher approval rating or there is 
another major terrorist attack) the Court will be much less likely to stand in the President’s 
way. Additionally, as pointed out by Pushaw: 
America has experienced cycles before in which the 
Court has asserted broad authority to review the exercise of war 
powers.  But that approach has never lasted.  Rather, the Justices 
typically have exercised their discretion to yield to the political 
branches in military matters, often because they had no other 
realistic choice.  This history suggests that the “enemy 
combatant” cases will not have a profound lasting impact.139 
 
After reviewing the constitutional war powers granted to the executive and legislative 
branches and the subsequent legislation and case law, it seems clear that when it comes to 
choosing between a war (kill/capture) or crime (arrest/prosecute) paradigm the government is 
relatively unconstrained.  Despite the fact that there have recently been some minor obstacles 
put before the President in deciding whether to use military commissions or Article III courts 
to prosecute terrorists, the authority of the President to make the final decision will 
eventually win out.  Therefore, it seems clear that by responding to 9/11 with the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration acted both constitutionally and legally.  Yet, 
there is more to evaluating the actions of our government in response to terrorism than legal 
evaluation.  In addition to being legal, we tend to want our government to do what is “right.”  
That is why the Section IV will provide an ethical evaluation of the Bush administration’s 
response to 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
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 In evaluating our current counter-terrorism policy, one important consideration we 
should take into account is the policy’s ethical basis.  In this section, the moral basis for the 
current U.S. “war on terror” will be evaluated.  Additionally, I will consider not only whether 
the current wars are just, but also whether there can be such a thing as a just counter-terror 
war.  Finally, I will make an ethical evaluation of the U.S. hybridization of the war and crime 
paradigms as part of U.S. counter-terror policy.  
Although there are some who would deny the existence of an objective morality, that 
view does not seem to correspond with our intuitions about the world.  On a daily basis we 
all make judgments and evaluations about what is right or wrong.  We try to edify our moral 
values to our children,140 our elders and our teachers try to pass their values on to us, and we 
like to think that we are doing our best to live up to these values.  There are certainly 
instances where morality is clear (e.g., the Holocaust was obviously a moral outrage), but 
there are also instances in which it is more difficult to identify which actions are or are not 
morally acceptable (Philippa Foot’s “trolley problem” is a particularly troubling example141).  
Yet, despite these complications, we all seem to have some sense of what is generally right 
and wrong (e.g., most people seem to recognize that donating money to charity is good and 
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murdering is bad, even if they don’t do what is right in either instance).  There is no good 
reason, then, to exclude this sense of ethics from our political decision-making. 
When it comes to our choice of paradigms for counter-terrorism policy, the crime 
paradigm seems morally uncontroversial.  Although there have been many critiques made 
about pre-9/11 U.S. counter-terrorism policy, these critiques have been aimed more at the 
policy’s inefficiency or poor organization than at any moral deficiencies.  In vast contrast, it 
seems that a large portion of the critiques of the post-9/11 policy have been morally based.  
For example, Professor of Law and Philosophy at Georgetown University, David Luban, has 
said that the particular style of the U.S. war on terror “increased American power while 
decreasing the rights of both the enemy and the innocent bystander.”142  For this reason it 
makes sense, first, to assess whether the war on terror has been morally just. 
In order to evaluate the morality of the war on terror we need some sort of ethical 
framework from which to judge it.  Unfortunately, making a moral assessment of a war is a 
complicated process, which neither Kantian Deontology nor Utilitarianism, two of the most 
prominent ethical theories, can satisfactorily accomplish. 
 
The Shortcomings of Kantian Deontology 
Kantian Deontology, based on the ethical views of the German philosopher, 
Immanuel Kant, claims that in order to evaluate the morality of actions we need to test them 
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against what he calls the Categorical Imperative.143  In the Fundamental Principles of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant gave two versions of the Categorical Imperative: 
1. Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law.144 
2. So act that you treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means 
only.145 
Without getting too far into analysis of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, what can be said is 
that neither version offers a clear guiding principle for how to act in war.  In Kant’s first 
version, he is claiming that each time we act, our action can be thought of as following a 
maxim (for example, if someone robs a bank, they are following the maxim “I will rob a 
bank.”).  He then explains that our action is only morally acceptable if we, the person 
performing the action, would find it acceptable that everyone acts according to that maxim.  
The implication of this is that for it to be moral for me to rob a bank I must find it acceptable 
that everyone rob a bank.  A hidden issue here, though, is that Kant seems to assume the 
rationality of all people.  In other words, the first version of the Categorical Imperative 
would lead to the implication that if a suicidal leader of a nuclear power (leader X) found it 
acceptable that everyone act on the maxim “I will fire my nuclear weapons at neighboring 
states,” it would be morally acceptable for leader X to do so.  Of course, one could attempt to 
salvage this version of the Categorical Imperative by claiming that making these judgments 
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should be restricted to rational people, but then it will become very complicated to figure out 
who can and who cannot make moral judgments.  Additionally, it seems possible that 
rational people would disagree about which maxims are acceptable, leaving us with the same 
action being immoral for some and moral for other. 
 The second version of the Categorical Imperative also has some problems.  In the 
second version, Kant is claiming that we ought to treat people not as means, but as ends in 
themselves.  When it comes to the military, this is particularly troubling because almost 
every order given from a superior to an inferior serviceman treats that serviceman as a means 
to accomplish whatever end the superior had in mind.  Yet it certainly seems morally 
acceptable for a senior officer to ask his soldiers, for example, to defend their position should 
they come under attack.  In such an instance the officer is treating his soldiers as means to 
accomplishing the end of protecting their position.  According to Kant, then, the officer is 
acting immorally.  Of course, this same problem of superiors treating inferiors as means to 
ends would arise in all hierarchical organizations (e.g., police departments, the Department 
of Motor Vehicle, etc…).  With problems of this sort, it is clear that neither version of Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative is up to the task of evaluating actions in war.  Although Utilitarianism 
suffers from different problems, it will not be up to the task of performing the evaluations 
needed here either.   
 
The Shortcomings of Utilitarianism 
 Utilitarianism, which is arguably the best-known version of consequentialism, goes in 
the opposite direction of Kant’s theory by judging actions not by the intent of the actor but 
by the results of each action.   In his book, Utilitarianism, the British philosopher, John 
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Stuart Mill, claimed, “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems 
natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are 
subservient.”146  The specific end that Mill felt each action should be measured by was the 
amount of happiness or as Mill called it, utility, it brought to the world.  So in the case of 
choosing between two actions, one must always choose that which would have the greatest 
utility, i.e., produce the most happiness.  Yet, despite Utilitarianism’s seeming clarity 
compared to Kantian Deontology, some of its implications are wildly counter-intuitive.   
 One problem with Utilitarianism is that is fails to grasp the fact that as people, we tend 
to judge the morality of actions not only by their results, but by the intended purpose of the 
action as well.  So, for example, helping an elderly woman to cross the street because we feel 
it is the right thing to do, according to most intuitions, is morally better than helping her 
across the street because we are hoping she will give us a few dollars in return.  Yet, 
utilitarianism would claim that these actions are morally equivalent if they have the same 
result.  Likewise, if while attempting to cross the street we were to trip and accidentally 
knock the elderly woman in front of a bus, Mill would have us believe that this was no 
different than had we intentionally shoved the woman in front of the bus (assuming that the 
utility or negative utility produced by each action was the same).  In response to this, 
utilitarian philosophers would likely claim that the problem lies not in Utilitarianism but in 
our intuitions.  Yet even if we were to accept that intentions do not matter, there are still 
actions that can be justified by Utilitarianism which are not only counter-intuitive but seem 
to be morally repugnant. 
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 Although there are many horrible actions that can be justified by Utilitarianism (Judith 
Jarvis Thomson’s organ harvest147 and Robert Nozick’s experience machine148 scenarios do a 
great job of pointing out some examples), these atrocities seem to be most salient when 
utilitarian judgments are made regarding war. Since the only goal of Utilitarianism is to 
maximize the amount of happiness in the world, it seems that this can justify outrageous acts 
of inhumanity.  For example, imagine that there is a school filled with 200 innocent children 
in country X.  Additionally, the leader of country X, leader X, is getting ready to wage a war 
against country Y that will cost thousands of lives on either side.  However, if country Y 
were to bomb the school and kill all the children, leader X would likely call off the war (this 
can be for any number of reasons, e.g., war would be politically unpopular after such a 
massacre).  According to Utilitarianism, if the calculations show that by killing the children, 
country Y can preserve the lives of thousands of others and maximize the amount of 
happiness in the world, it would be morally acceptable for Country Y to carry out the attack.  
As should be clear, this logic can lead to the result that horrendous actions in war are morally 
acceptable.  What must be recognized is that the main fault in Utilitarianism is that it 
disregards each individual’s right to life (which was discussed in Section I).  To recap, as 
humans we enjoy certain basic rights.  Professor of Philosophy and Frank Henry Sommer 
Professor of Law at New York University, Rondald Dworkin, may best explain this in his 
book Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties: 
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Among the most fundamental of all moral principles is the 
principle of shared humanity: that every human life has a 
distinct and equal inherent value. This principle is the 
indispensable premise of the idea of human rights, that is, the 
rights people have just in virtue of being human....149 
 
Most fundamental amongst these rights is the right to life.  If as humans we have any rights, 
certainly one of them must be the right to continue living.  Furthermore, this right to life 
must imply some duty on others not to interfere with it, for it is otherwise nearly 
meaningless.  This means that, not only do we have a right to continue living, but that others 
are morally required not to interfere with that right.  In the previously discussed case of 
country Y bombing a school in country X, the bombing would directly interfere with the 
right to life of the children and so is immoral.  Regardless of whether people would generally 
be better off, bombing the school ignores the individual right to life of each child in the 
school. 
 Since it is clear that the two most prominent moral theories run into so many problems 
when it comes to war, any moral evaluation must use alternative means.  In order to evaluate 
war, then, the best approach would be to focus on a more practical moral assessment.  
Instead of taking a universal moral principle and then trying to apply it to all situations, 
including war, it would be more useful to simply codify the factors that make actions in war 
just or unjust.  One approach, and the approach which I believe better accounts for the 
individual right to life, is what is known as Just War Theory. 
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Just War Theory 
 Just War Theory is a collection of doctrines that have been examined by philosophers 
stretching as far back as Aristotle in ancient Greece150 to contemporary philosophers, most 
notably the Institute for Advanced Study’s Michael Walzer.  The basis of the doctrines lie on 
a continuum between pacifism and realism.  The Just War theorist denies the pacifist’s claim 
that going to war is never justified, while also denying the realist’s claim that morality 
should have no role in war.  Not only does this view seem to bode well with most of our 
intuitions but it has, additionally, served in some way as a guide for U.S. Presidents.  Just to 
give a few examples, Presidents Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and Jimmy Carter have all 
claimed to have been influenced, at times, by Just War Theory.151  Most recently, while 
accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in December of 2009, President Obama pointed out that 
“There will be times when nations — acting individually or in concert — will find the use of 
force not only necessary but morally justified.”152  It will be useful, then, both to evaluate 
whether Just War Theory gives us morally acceptable rules to follow in a counter-terror war, 
as well as whether those rules have been followed in the War on Terror. 
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Just War Theory is 
traditionally broken up into three parts: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum.153  
Jus ad bellum or the “law up to war” deals with distinguishing under what conditions a group 
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may go to war.  Jus in bello, which means “law in war” governs what may be done within a 
war.  Finally, jus post bellum or “law after war” deals with what conditions are morally 
required at the conclusion of war.  As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are still under way 
(despite the President’s claims that “combat-operations” have ended in Iraq), I will not 
consider jus post bellum.  I will, thus, begin this analysis with jus ad bellum. 
 
Jus Ad Bellum 
In order to begin a just war, there are several jus ad bellum criteria that must be met.  
The first, and possibly the most important, is that the war has a just cause.  Although, in the 
past, just cause has been thought to include many different factors, today, according to a 
Baruch College Professor of Philosophy, Douglas P. Lackey, the only cause for war that can 
be considered just is “self-defense.”154  Although the cause of self-defense has been 
expanded lately to include defense of others, as well as preemption (going to war prior to an 
impending attack), it has not been expanded to include prevention (going to war to prevent 
the possibility of a future attack).  Simply based on this initial criterion, it is clear that the 
war in Iraq has been unjust.   
In the Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, there 
were several reasons cited for the war.155  Amongst those reasons were the Iraqi regime’s 
possession of WMDs, their connection to the 9/11 attacks, and their providing safe havens 
for terrorists.   Although it seems that any one of these reasons could have added support for, 
if not satisfied the requirements of the first criterion of jus ad bellum, nearly eight years after 
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the initial invasion it seems clear that none of the three justifications had any credibility.  In 
fact, the entire basis of the claim that Saddam had a fully functioning WMD program seems 
to have been based on faulty intelligence provided by a single individual.156  After the 
invasion of Iraq failed to yield any sign of a WMD program, it seems that the war had shifted 
from having justifications based on actual self-defense to justifications based on the spread 
of democracy and defeat of terrorists who had moved into Iraq to create an insurgency.  What 
is clear, then, is that the war in Iraq was not undertaken in response to an actual, but to a 
perceived need for self-defense.   
Last September, Jeffrey Montrose pointed out in the Royal Institute of Philosophy’s 
Journal, Think, “Because the evidence given for the war [in Iraq], namely weapons of mass 
destruction, proved to never exist, it wouldn’t be too hard to argue the war as unjust.”157  In 
fact, it is simply based on the first criterion of jus ad bellum that the war is shown to be 
unjust.  There was neither an actual attack nor a pending attack on the U.S. by Iraq, nor was 
there an ongoing massacre of Iraqi civilians for the U.S. to stop (the defense of others can 
only be used to justify going to war when there is ongoing or impending harm posed by the 
aggressor state).  As pointed out by a Boston University professor, Neta Crawford, in 
referring to the war in Iraq, “the administration’s ‘preemption’ strategy is actually, in large 
degree, a preventive (early offensive) war strategy that seeks to maintain U.S. preeminence 
by reducing or eliminating the military capabilities of potential adversaries even before 
potential rivals have acquired those capabilities—and in the absence of clear intention and 
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plans to use weapons against the United States.”158  The lack of a just cause for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom meant that the war was unjust and so will require no further analysis.  
Fortunately, the same critique cannot be made of the U.S. war in Afghanistan.   
The U.S. went to war in Afghanistan in direct response to the attacks of 9/11, which, 
according to the principles of jus ad bellum, provided a just cause for Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  Of course, there were other factors that went into the decision to invade 
Afghanistan, but in general, it seems that the U.S. was justified in responding to 9/11 with 
such an attack.  To further clarify, I would say that an attack like 9/11 can be seen as a just 
cause for going to war based on the rights to life that have been discussed throughout this 
paper.   
As was mentioned earlier, individuals enjoy a right to life that implies a 
corresponding duty on others not to interfere with that right.  In addition, I would say that 
this right to life implies a right to self-defense.  If a right to continue living is to have any 
substance, it must be the case that one is justified in defending their right life should others 
try to interfere with it.  Additionally, I believe that one can view a country, such as the 
United States, as a collection of people who enjoy a right to life.  In circumstances such as 
ours, in which we become part of the same society, it seems that there would clearly be some 
collective right to self-defense: Just as a mother is justified not only in defending the rights 
to life of herself but of her children, the members of a society are not only justified in 
defending their own right to life but the right to life of their fellow citizens.  As was the case 
with 9/11 (and the continued existence of Al Qaida), although it was only New York and 
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Washington, D.C. that came under attack, the collective right of self-defense in the United 
States meant that the country had a right to defend itself against further attack. 
It is not only a just cause, though, that is required for jus ad bellum to be satisfied.  In 
order to further analyze whether Operation Enduring Freedom is a just war, it must be tested 
against all of the other criteria of jus ad bellum, which are as follows: 
1. A just war must be fought for the purpose of peace and 
reconciliation.159 
2. A just war must be fought as a last resort.160 
3. A just war must be undertaken by a legitimate or 
“competent” authority.161 
4. A just war must have a probability of success.162 
5. A just war must have ends proportional in good to the evil 
associated with war.163 
 
Although there have been attempts at formulating additional criteria, these five plus the 
original just cause criterion seem to be universally accepted amongst Just War theorists.  In 
fact, the leading modern Just War theorist, Michael Walzer, supported all of these criteria in 
his book, Just and Unjust Wars.164  Additionally, these criteria are particularly useful in their 
relative clarity compared to theories like Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology.  First, the 
requirement of fighting for peace simply means that the goal of the war should not be 
retribution or justice.  This requirement is based on the idea that war is an intrinsically bad 
thing and should only be conducted for the purpose of limiting further violence (and not for 
the sake of punishing aggressors).  On a similar line of thought, the second criterion points 
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out that since war is bad, alternate means of accomplishing its goals should be sought before 
it is used.  How much of an effort is required when attempting to seek alternative means to 
war is not completely clear, but as was the case with the actions of the Bush administration, 
the opposing state or group should be offered some means through which to avoid war.165 
 The third criterion, that a just war requires a legitimate or competent authority simply 
limits wars to being undertaken by sovereign or legitimate powers, which in most cases (but 
not always) are states.  The fourth and fifth requirements, similar to the first and second, 
recognize that war is bad and so require that a war be likely to end in success (otherwise 
undertaking the war would cause pointless suffering) and that there be some measure of 
proportionality in undertaking the war (you should not launch a war which may kill 
thousands over a single bullet shot across a border), respectively. 
 Of the jus ad bellum criteria, they all seem to be not only reasonable restrictions on 
war but neither overly restrictive nor overly permissive.  First, if all nations followed them 
there would obviously be no wars (since the only justified attacks are made in self-defense).  
Even in the event that there are wars (as a result of one group being an aggressor), they 
would only be fought under limited circumstances that eliminate wars that are immoral.  
Additionally, it seems that the U.S., in deciding to go to war in Afghanistan, has followed 
these criteria to some extent.  There are a few critiques that some may raise (e.g., the U.S. 
went to war for the sake of retribution or the war was not fought as a last resort) but it seems 
that the U.S. made a reasonably just decision in deciding to go to war in response to 9/11.  
                                                        
165 In the case of Afghanistan, the Bush administration demanded that the Taliban turn Osama 
bin Laden over to the United States.  It was the Taliban that refused to comply. 
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When it comes to the criteria of jus in bello, however, Operation Enduring Freedom has not 
done quite so well. 
 
Jus In Bello 
 Although there have been many different attempts at making clear restrictions on 
what is and is not permissible conduct in war, there are three principles which are central to 
jus in bello: necessity, proportionality, and discrimination.166  Necessity is the requirement 
that any combative action taken in war be necessary, or in other words, serve the aim of 
successfully completing the war.  This means that killing, just for the sake of killing is 
prohibited.  In addition, as Crawford points out, “The proportionality criterion [distinct from 
the jus ad bellum requirement] prescribes that violence be in proportion to the aims of war; 
gratuitous violence should be avoided.”167  Finally, the principle of discrimination, also 
known as the principle of discrimination and non-combatant immunity, draws a line between 
who and what is and is not an acceptable target of attack.   According to Brian Orend, 
Director of International Studies and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo, 
the principle of discrimination requires that “armies are to discriminate or distinguish 
between military and civilian targets, and aim their lethal force only at legitimate military, 
and military supply, targets.”168  The typical sentiment, then, is that it is morally acceptable 
to attack combatants and unacceptable to attack “innocents.”  As a side note, the term 
“innocence,” when it comes to war does not refer to someone’s lack of guilt or as New 
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York University professor; Thomas Nagel calls it, “moral innocence.”169 In war 
innocence is a reference to whether someone directly contributes to the harm posed by 
a combative force, e.g., innocents are civilians and non-innocents are combatants.  
In addition to these three principles, one common restriction is on the types of tactics 
and weapons used in war, so as to avoid a feeling of future animosity that will make a lasting 
peace less likely.  Typically referred to as means mala in se (wrong in itself), these 
restrictions are on the use of weapons and tactics that are considered particularly brutal or 
indiscriminate (these include flamethrowers, napalm, cluster bombs, chemical and biological 
agents, etc….).170     
In evaluating the war in Afghanistan, it is particularly tough to identify violations of 
the necessity and proportionality doctrines.  Especially since the war is ongoing, it is tough 
to say whether, for example, all of the actions being taken are necessary for the success of 
the war, although it is likely that some were not.  Yet, with the lack obvious violations of 
either principle at this point in time, we can assume that, for the most part, American actions 
in Afghanistan have stayed within the confines of proportionality and necessity. The same 
cannot necessarily be said, though, for the principle of discrimination.   
 When it comes to the principle of discrimination, it stands out that what is banned is 
the killing of civilians, yet it goes without saying that there are not and most likely have 
never been any wars free of civilian death.  This leaves the Just War theorist in a tough 
position: either allow that there be some justifiable civilian deaths or accept that there can 
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only be theoretical but not actual just wars.  It is in response to this point that the principle of 
double effect is added to the just war doctrine. 
 
Double Effect 
 The principle of double effect draws a distinction between intentions and effects.   In 
war, it is said, that when a justified attack is carried out against an appropriate target, 
foreseeable civilian casualties are not the moral responsibility of the attacker.  In other 
words, the attacker is responsible for the destruction caused to the intended target (the 
military target) but is not responsible for the civilian deaths since they were not intended but 
were just a side effect or collateral damage.  Although this may sound suspect at first, we do 
actually apply the doctrine of double effect in our daily lives.  For example, when 
construction workers create roads or when engineers build cars, it is foreseeable that some 
people will die as a result (the Center for Disease Control counted 42,031 motor vehicle 
traffic deaths in the U.S. in 2007).171  We do not, however, think that what the construction 
workers and engineers do is immoral.  It seems correct to say that their intentions were only 
to provide us with cars and roads and that any deaths that result were just an unfortunate side 
effect that they did not intend.  Now, what must be said is that, as Walzer points out, “due 
care” must be taken to avoid unnecessary negative side effects.172  So, for example, should 
the factory worker run out of screws and use bubble gum to secure a tire or the construction 
worker fails to put up stop signs at the corner of adjacent streets, we would say that although 
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they did not intend resultant deaths they are still morally responsible.  The same due care 
should be applied in war before double effect is allowed to be used.   
In response to the aforementioned examples of the application of double effect, it may 
certainly be noted that construction and vehicle production are not clearly analogous to 
actions in war.  What must be recognized, though, is that when we judge the morality of 
people’s actions, especially when they have some bad results, we give a large amount of 
weight to their intentions.  This is exactly why double effect is so important: it restricts moral 
blame to the intentions of actions, as long as the actor took due care to avoid other negative 
effects.  For the sake of clarification, another scenario should be helpful.  
Imagine a pilot is attempting to land a passenger plane, but he misjudges the approach 
to the runway and ends up hitting a large office building.  On 9/11 we found the results of 
such an action (flying a plane into a building) to be morally horrendous.173  Yet although the 
results of the pilot’s actions are the same as those of the hijackers, we would probably think 
of it as more of a tragedy than a moral outrage.  So, in this case, with the results being 
identical, the distinguishing feature is that the hijackers intended to kill innocent people and 
the pilot did not.  If the pilot failed to take due care (for instance, if he was drunk), we would 
feel that he was morally responsible, but in this case he was not.  Of course, there are still 
discrepancies between this scenario and actions in war.  As a result, one may claim that while 
double effect applies in this case, it does not in war because the pilot here did not intend to 
kill anyone and was also a victim himself.  Both of these issues, however, can be easily 
resolved. 
                                                        
173 Of course, the hijackers did not think their actions were morally repugnant.  However, I 
would assume that had American terrorists performed similar attacks in the Middle East, the 
9/11 hijackers would think the American actions were horrendous. 
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Imagine one more scenario.  Again, there is a pilot, but this time of a fighter jet.  
When attempting to maneuver for a bombing run on some enemy combatants, the pilot 
misjudges his approach and is about to crash into an office building.  This time, though, the 
pilot manages to eject himself in the nick of time, but the plane still crashes into the building, 
killing innocent people.  Again, imagine that the pilot took due care: he honestly believed he 
would not hit the building, there was no other way for him to approach the targeted 
individuals, and the people in the building were notified beforehand that they should 
evacuate but chose not to.   In this case, it still seems that the pilot is not morally responsible 
for the deaths of the innocent individuals.  So, it must be the case that double effect can 
apply in war, as well.  In order to explain how this works further what is really needed is an 
account of when deaths in war are and are not morally acceptable, especially if a final 
evaluation of the war in Afghanistan is going to be possible. 
 Earlier in this section I rejected the use of purely Utilitarian reasoning for evaluating 
the morality of warfare.  The problem with the Utilitarian principle seemed to be that it 
counts people strictly as functions of utility, not as individual people who have rights.  It 
seemed that, in some way, no matter what the results of not attacking the school full of 
children in the scenario I provided would be, there was just something horrible about doing it 
(even if the results of not doing it would turn out worse for other people).  What I think can 
help provide us with a better guide than Utilitarian calculations is creating a framework, 
based around rights of individuals, to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable 
attacks.  In order to formulate this framework, it will be necessary further to distinguish 
between innocents and combatants by breaking people up into the following categories 
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according to the rights they enjoy: innocent civilians, passively complacent civilians, 
actively complacent civilians, child soldiers, and combatants/soldiers.   
 
Categories of Individuals 
What I will say first is that if we are going to have a moral war there must be a 
complete prohibition on intentionally attacking civilians.  I would attribute this both to the 
idea that attacks of this sort are intentional violations of noncombatants’ rights to life and 
also to the fact that civilians pose no direct threat to the opposing force.  It is the fact that by 
becoming combatants people directly contribute to the harm posed by a combatant force that 
they become legitimate targets of attack.  Likewise, it is because noncombatants do not 
directly (although they may indirectly) contribute to this threat that they are not.174  
Additionally, if one claims that it is morally acceptable for civilians to be the direct object of 
attack under the doctrine of double effect (for example, the claim might be made that the 
intention of the attack is really to end a war more quickly by forcing the opposing 
government into surrender, and that the civilian deaths are side effects), they would have to 
make the same evaluations of some terrorist attacks.  In fact, it must be said that not only are 
terrorist attacks immoral (since by nature they are attacks on innocents) but that, as pointed 
out in section I of this paper, many of the allied attacks in World War II both on Japan and 
Germany targeted the civilian populations, and so were not only immoral but were actually 
acts of terrorism themselves.  It seems, then, that we must account for the jump from it being, 
always and everywhere, unacceptable to directly target civilians to wars having acceptable 
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civilian deaths.   This is because if there were no acceptable civilian deaths, the collective 
right of self-defense (which was discussed earlier) would be meaningless.  Since the only 
way to defend a nation, at times, is to go to war and all modern wars involve civilian deaths, 
it must be the case that some civilian deaths are morally acceptable. 
 In outlining the five categories of people in these conflicts, I have also laid out the 
rights that they enjoy.  Again, I wish to make the claim that all humans enjoy a right to life 
and that in their natural state (non-combative) all humans enjoy it equally.  What happens in 
war, however, is that combatants, be they soldiers, mercenaries, or insurgents, limit their own 
right to life.175  One piece of evidence for this claim is the oath U.S. servicemen take upon 
enlisting:     
I, (NAME), do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and 
defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, 
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to 
the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the 
United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, 
according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice. So help me God.176 
 
By enlisting in the U.S. military, servicemen take this oath, swearing to follow all 
constitutional orders of their superiors.  As a member of the U.S. military, servicemen 
sacrifice, in part, their rights to freedom of speech and freedom of movement.  Of course, 
this is not the only way someone may knowingly sacrifice a right.  For example, if you are 
arrested in the United States, you are allowed to waive your right to remain silent.  
Additionally, as Lackey points out in “The Truth About Pacifism,” “…it is always 
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permissible to waive one’s right to self-defence.”177   Furthermore, even combatants who do 
not take an oath limit their right to life, since participating in hostile actions a combatant, as 
Walzer explains, “alienates himself from me…and from our common humanity.”178  I do not 
mean to claim, though, that combatants sacrifice all their rights, nor that they sacrifice their 
right to life in its entirety, as Walzer seems to claim.179  The reason this is important is that 
since combatants sacrifice some of their right to life, they are charged with sacrificing some 
of their own safety if it means that it will provide more safety for those who have not made 
such right sacrifices.  All of this leaves one to ask what the implications are of the 
combatant’s forfeiture of rights.  As the most highly protected class, innocent civilians 
should be considered first.  
As mentioned earlier, direct targeting of innocent civilians is unjust.  Moreover, it is not 
until certain criteria are met that double effect can excuse a combatant from causing the 
deaths of innocent civilians, who are not directly targeted.  Between the requirements of jus 
in bello as well as the consideration of rights, I believe that there are some general 
requirements that may be extracted in order to formulate criteria for when double effect may 
be applied.  First, like a direct attack on civilians, an attack on a structure where civilian 
death is clearly foreseeable is also unjust (otherwise double effect could be used to justify all 
sorts of terrorist attacks).  Second, an attack on enemy combatants in which civilians are also 
killed (and it was reasonably foreseeable that they would be) is morally acceptable if and 
only if the following criteria are met: 
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1. The attack is taking place as part of a war that meets all of 
the jus ad bellum criteria. 
2. It is not the intention of the attacker that the civilians would 
be harmed. 
3. The attack is a military necessity as required by jus in bello. 
4. The attacker cannot take on more reasonable risk in order to 
limit the risk to innocent civilians. 
5. The proportion (in numbers) of enemy combatants to 
innocent civilians killed must be large. 
 
These criteria warrant some explanation.  The purpose of the first criterion should be 
obvious.   If any attack is carried out as part of a war that is already unjust, there is no way 
that deaths of innocent civilians, much less any deaths, can be justified on account of just 
war criteria.180 
 For the second criterion, it is necessary that the innocent civilian deaths not be 
intended or double effect is not operational.  Additionally, the requirement of the third 
criterion should be clear from the earlier discussion of the doctrine of necessity.  When it 
comes to the fourth criterion, though, the explanation is not quite so simple.   
As was mentioned earlier, all humans enjoy the same rights to life, but combatants 
waive those rights to a large degree.  This means that civilian lives (even of the opposing 
group) must be given greater regard than those of the combatants (even of one’s own forces).  
So if a military leader is tasked with choosing between an airstrike that will not cause any 
military deaths for his own force but ten civilian deaths, whereas a ground assault will have 
similar success but with ten military deaths and no civilian deaths, it is required that he 
choose the ground assault.  It is not the case, however, that the military leader must have his 
                                                        
180 It may, however, be the case that certain deaths that occur during an unjust war are still 
morally acceptable on bases which are extrinsic to the just war doctrine.  For instance, 
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soldiers take unlimited risks.  For example, imagine that in the same scenario, the ground 
assault would be successful, but the military leader would lose 1,000 of his combatants.  In a 
case like this, it would be acceptable to choose the airstrike.  Of course, the choices the 
military leader must make are clear in extreme cases like this, but when closer numbers of 
combatant (of the attacking force) and civilian deaths are likely to result, it is more difficult 
to point out which courses of action are just.  What must be said, then, is that in choosing 
between one method of attack and another, significantly more weight must be given to the 
lives of innocent civilians, who have not sacrificed any of their rights, than lives of the 
combatants who have.  A good rule of thumb may be, as Walzer claims, that “The limits of 
risk are fixed…roughly at the point where any further risk-taking would almost certainly 
doom the military venture or make it so costly that it could not be repeated.”181 
Finally, the fifth criterion that must be met in order to carry out an attack in which 
deaths of innocent civilians are clearly foreseeable relates to the proportion of deaths of 
enemy combatants to civilians killed.  In other words, if a military force is to carry out an 
attack on enemy combatants, it ought to be the case that there are more combatant deaths 
than civilian.  The implication of this criterion is that the attacking force is not allowed to 
carry out indiscriminate attacks, for example, on crowded marketplaces, weddings, etc… 
where a small number of enemy combatants may be surrounded by large numbers of innocent 
civilians.  This, of course, does not rule out more accurate approaches, like raids. 
Additionally, there is one problem with this criterion that must be addressed.  
When discussing the fifth criterion (for when it is acceptable to apply double effect to 
attacks with clearly foreseeable civilian casualties) it must be recognized that there is an 
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issue with its application: If no particular ratio of acceptable enemy combatant to civilian 
deaths is prescribed, this rule will probably have very different implications in attacks carried 
out under different leaders.  One way around this issue is to set a particular acceptable ratio 
but then we will run into what is called a sorites paradox.182  In other words, if we set an 
acceptable ratio of 100 enemy combatant deaths for every five civilian deaths, we run into 
the issue that six civilian deaths would be unacceptable.  Yet, claiming that five civilian 
deaths are acceptable but six civilian deaths are not is treating nearly identical situations in 
wildly different manners.  However, compared to the alternative strategy (of not setting an 
exact ratio and leaving commanders on the ground to make moral judgments of this sort in 
the heat of battle), it is likely to have far worse consequences than setting an arbitrary ratio.  
For that reason, a policy attempting to follow just war criteria should include an acceptable 
combatant to civilian death ratio for attacks involving foreseeable civilian deaths.183   
A closely related question to the one just discussed is how to apply double effect for 
innocent civilian deaths in circumstances where civilian deaths seem unlikely.  In such 
instances, the restrictions will be almost identical to the restrictions on instances with clearly 
foreseeable deaths, except for criteria four and five.  Again, restrictions four and five are: 
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Philosopher's Debate." Parameter, Journal of the US Army War College XI.3 (1981): 75-86. 
Web. 02 Feb. 2011. 
 83 
4. The attacker cannot take on more reasonable risk in order to 
limit the risk to innocent civilians. 
5. The proportion (in numbers) of enemy combatants to 
innocent civilians killed must be large. 
 
In an instance where it seemed unlikely that civilians would be killed, it still is reasonable to 
hold combatants to criteria one, two, and three of the double effect criteria for instances in 
which civilian death seems likely. What criterion four is calling for is due care, as was 
pointed out earlier by Walzer.  Yet in the circumstances we are now talking about, the 
combatant is unaware of the threat he will pose to civilians.  What criterion four should be, 
then, is that the combatant must take reasonable steps to investigate whether it is likely that 
civilians will be killed (in cases where the combatant is relying on intelligence provided by a 
third party it is the moral responsibility of the third party to provide such information).  If at 
that point it turns out that it is likely that civilians will be killed, the combatant’s 
responsibilities revert to the five criteria for double effect in such circumstances.  If, 
however, the combatant takes reasonable steps to investigate whether it is likely that civilians 
will be killed and it still seems unlikely, step five should no longer apply.  In other words, if 
steps one through four are properly followed and civilian death still seems unlikely, any 
civilian deaths that occur under such circumstances are not the moral responsibility of the 
combatant.  This is double effect acting at full capacity. Again, what we are talking about 
here is a case of an actual accident in which soldiers were both doing their duty and trying to 
act morally (as in the scenario of the fighter jet that crashed into an office building earlier in 
this section).  It seems, then, that even in cases where there are civilian deaths and no enemy 
combatant deaths that a set of criteria for these deaths to be morally acceptable may be 
formatted as follows: 
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1. The attack is taking place as part of a war that meets all of the 
jus ad bellum criteria. 
2. It is not the intention of the attacker that civilians would be 
harmed. 
3. The attack is a military necessity as required by jus in bello. 
4. The attacker (or those responsible for providing the attacker 
with intelligence) made a legitimate effort to verify that civilian 
deaths were unlikely. 
 
Just to clarify, then, we can imagine a scenario likely to have occurred in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  In both Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, a major threat to 
American soldiers has been the use of VBIEDS (vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
devices).  Because of the large amount of explosives that can be held in a vehicle, a very 
effective way to overcome the protective abilities of armored coalition vehicles is to drive a 
VBIED up to a coalition vehicle and detonate it.  Even if the armor is not pierced by the 
detonation, it is still possible to kill combatants inside because the impact may be worse than 
that in a car accident.  As a way of countering this tactic, coalition forces have required that 
when they are driving through certain areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, all vehicles pull off to 
the side of the road.  In order to protect civilians, the directive in these areas has also been 
that if a vehicle is not complying (they are driving towards a coalition convoy), the coalition 
forces must first waive an orange flag and use hand signals to try to get the approaching 
vehicle to pull off the road.  If the vehicle continues towards the coalition convoy, they must 
then shoot a flare, followed by warning shots fired into a safe direction, followed by shooting 
at the approaching vehicle’s tires, followed by shooting at the approaching vehicle’s engine 
block, and finally, if there is no other way to prevent the vehicle from approaching the 
convoy the soldiers can fire on its occupants.  All of these precautions are taken to avoid an 
instance where a civilian driver, who is unaware of the rules or is oblivious to what is going 
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on around him or her, becomes the target of a defensive attack.  Unfortunately, all of these 
steps put the coalition forces at further risk but, as has obviously been recognized by the area 
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, combatants have a responsibility to take due care in 
avoiding civilian death.  Were civilians to be killed while driving what seemed to be a 
VBIED up to a coalition convoy in Afghanistan, and had the coalition forces followed the 
four criteria for such circumstances, the death would be unfortunate but not the moral 
responsibility of the combatants. 
 Besides innocent civilians there are still four other groups of people to be discussed.  
These groups, however, have slightly easier statuses to deal with. First, combatants must 
have the least number of restrictions on attacking, since they, as pointed out by Walzer, 
largely sacrifice their right to life.  Assuming that the means used in an attack against 
combatants are not mala in se, all of the previously discussed rules require only that the 
attack be part of a war, which satisfies all of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria.  In an 
article for the Ford Institute for Human Security, Jeff McMahan explains, “it is not the 
posing of a threat but only the posing of an unjust threat that can make a person liable to 
defensive violence.”184  This means “that in general the only combatants who are morally 
justified in fighting are those who fight for a just cause in a just war.”185  Additionally, it 
must be recognized, though, that they do “gain war rights as combatants and potential 
prisoners…”186 Codified in the Geneva Conventions, these rights include, among other 
things, protections as prisoners of war, “particularly against acts of violence or intimidation 
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and against insults and public curiosity.”187  Additionally, prisoners of war must be treated 
for illnesses and released at the end of hostilities.188  The only exceptions to these rules are 
when those captured have violated the principles of international charters or jus in bello (this 
will be discussed further toward the end of this section) When it comes to complacent 
civilians, however, the restrictions more closely resemble those of innocent civilians than 
those of combatants.   
 Of complacent civilians, there are those who are passively complacent and those who 
are actively complacent.  The difference is that passively complacent civilians gain their 
status (rather than remaining innocent civilians) through an omission, such as knowing where 
insurgents are hiding but doing nothing to notify the opposing force.  On the other hand, 
actively complacent civilians take actual steps or actions to aid the insurgents, whether they 
be feeding them, providing them with shelter, or even allowing them to use their land for 
storage of weapons.  What seems to be happening in each of these cases is that the 
complacent civilians take a step away from innocence by adding to the threat of harm posed 
by a combatant force.   That being the case, the difference between complacent and innocent 
civilians is that the former group has slightly less of a claim to life.  One can picture, then, to 
some extent, a spectrum on which people lie from the greatest to the least right to life: 
innocent civilians, passively complacent civilians, actively complacent civilians, combatants 
(with there being a large distance between the actively complacent civilian and the 
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combatants since the combatant takes a much larger step towards posing harm).  The 
practical difference between innocent and complacent civilians is only the effect on the ratio 
of acceptable combatant to civilian deaths in attacks with foreseeable civilian casualties.  For 
example, if the ratio for combatant to innocent civilians was set at 100:5, as discussed earlier, 
we might want to set the ratio at 100:8 for the passively complacent civilians and 100:20 for 
the actively complacent civilians. Of course, these are once again arbitrary ratios, but they 
reflect the fact that these complacent civilians have taken some steps, be they acts or 
omissions, to add to the danger posed to soldiers, and so have forfeited some of their right to 
life.   
 The final group that must be considered is the child soldier.  Just as with other groups 
of people, child soldiers enjoy some right to life but they pose a peculiar problem in their 
seeming lack of moral responsibility for some actions.  In “An Ethical Perspective on Child 
Soldiers,” Jeff McMahan points out that in dealing with the issue of child soldiers, we must 
ask whether there is a “moral requirement to exercise restraint in fighting them…” and 
whether just combatants ought to “accept greater risks to themselves in order to minimize the 
harm they inflict on child soldiers?”189  
 In the war on terror, it has fortunately been the case that the use of child soldiers has 
been rare.  There have, however, been isolated incidents.  For example, in September of 2007 
insurgents in Iraq’s Anbar Province outfitted a fourteen-year-old boy with an explosive-laden 
suicide vest.  The boy, who was likely following the instructions of an adult, walked into an 
outdoor common area where several families had gathered to eat dinner (a common practice 
during Ramadan).  The boy began handing candy out to the children at the dinner and once 
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they had all gathered around him detonated the device, killing nearly everyone there, 
including himself.  Imagine that this same scenario was about to take place in Afghanistan, 
but a coalition soldier could stop it but only by killing the boy.  Certainly in this instance the 
soldier should stop the attack, even if it means killing a fourteen-year-old boy.  In this 
instance this may justified on the grounds that the boy is old enough that he is at least 
minimally responsible for the attack, and so he loses the large right to life enjoyed by 
civilians.   
 Imagine a similar scenario but now the child is six and he is unaware that what he is 
wearing is a bomb that will detonate at a predetermined time.  It is much tougher in this 
instance to say that the boy is even minimally responsible for the threat he is posing.   He 
seems to be, what McMahan refers to as a “nonresponsible threat.”  In other words, the child 
is causally involved in the threat but is not morally responsible for it.190  Additionally, 
imagine that instead of it being innocent families who are being threatened, it is one soldier 
who must either kill the child or be killed himself.  It seems that in this particular situation 
the soldier may kill the child because the child will die in the explosion and so their right to 
life will be violated either way.  We can, though, imagine that the child will somehow 
survive the explosion but the soldier will die.  Now, in either case only one person will die, 
the soldier or child.  Again, the child is a nonresponsible threat.  In this scenario it seems, 
then, that if we say the soldier can kill the child, he would also be able to do so with an 
innocent civilian who was somehow posing a nonresponsible threat (we can imagine a 
scenario in which an innocent civilian is driving a car, unaware that it has a bomb in it that 
will be detonated by a timer).  Yet, as was pointed out earlier, it is unacceptable to directly 
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target an individual who you believe to a civilian.  What we must conclude, then, is that in a 
case where the child is a truly non-responsible threat, the only basis on which the soldier can 
choose his or her own life is personal preference.  Furthermore, just as with innocent 
civilians, child soldiers in this case do not do anything, if they are non-responsible, to 
sacrifice their right to life, and so must their life must be taken to outweigh the adult 
soldier’s life.  Indeed, the soldier must choose the life of the child over his own.  Of course, 
this seems to go against common intuition.  We tend to feel that people have a right to self-
defense but that right seems to come from the diminished rights of the attacker because of 
their moral responsibility for the attack.  Fortunately, this common intuition does not have to 
be overridden in practice because it seems that there really are not any non-responsible 
threats of this sort. 
 As explained by McMahan, “the idea that even terribly abused children can be 
morally responsible for their action is not implausible.”191  We commonly hold children to be 
morally responsible for their actions from a very early age.  For example, McMahan points 
out that “If one’s own child or the neighbor’s child torments the cat, one regards it very 
differently from the way one regards the dog’s efforts to harm the cat.”192  When a pitbull 
attacks a passerby we tend to place all of the moral blame on the owner, since the dog is 
incapable of taking on moral responsibility.  In the case of humans, though, it seems that 
even children (who have developed basic mental capacities) have more responsibility for 
their actions than animals, and so must be at least minimally responsible for their actions. It 
being that case that children are at least minimally responsible for their actions, the 
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restrictions on soldiers in dealing with child combatants should be very similar to the 
restrictions for dealing with adult combatants: attacks that follow jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello requirements are morally acceptable.   
Because the basic guidelines for attacks on child and adult combatants are the same, 
though, does not imply that the attacks can be carried out in the same way.  Taking the 
proportionality requirement into consideration, we should recognize that the means 
acceptable for neutralizing the threats from those who are fully morally responsible are not 
all acceptable for use against those who are not.  For example, there is nothing wrong with 
using an air-to-surface missile to kill a group of adult combatants who are currently posing 
no harm, but the same cannot be said of a similar attack on a group of child soldiers.  In 
dealing with child soldiers, then, the requirement must be that the least amount of force 
possible is used, but that soldiers are not required to sacrifice their lives in order to avoid 
taking those of minimally responsible child soldiers.  The key here is the level of restraint 
that ought to be shown, which is unnecessary in combat against fully morally responsible 
adult soldiers.  Once again referring to McMahan, “Just combatants should show them [child 
soldiers] mercy, even at the cost of additional risk to themselves, to try to allow these already 
greatly wronged children a chance at life.”193  As a side note, it is worth mentioning that 
when child soldiers are killed in justified attacks, their deaths are at least partially the moral 
responsibility of the adults who turned them into combatants.  What this means is that even if 
these adults do not participate in combat directly, they can be considered combatants 
themselves and so are liable to attack. 
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 With all of the categories of people worked out, all that is left to do is analyze 
Operation Enduring Freedom according to these requirements.  There are two aspects of the 
war that we can analyze in regards to these requirements: whether particular attacks have 
been violating these rules and whether particular styles of attack in the war are mala in se.   
 
Jus In Bello in Afghanistan 
 In evaluating the impact of the War in Afghanistan on noncombatants, it is difficult to 
come up with reliable figures for civilian deaths and whom those deaths can be attributed to.  
One reason for this is obviously that the U.S. coalition has a vested interest in civilian 
casualty statistics being low, and the opposite is true for the insurgents.  Another reason for 
problems with the collection and analysis of civilian death rates is that the war is still going 
on, making it especially dangerous for human rights groups to collect such information.  
Still, some groups have tried to do this work and there are a few points that can be extracted 
from their research and put towards a moral evaluation.   
 Statistics on noncombatant deaths in Afghanistan seem to have become more widely 
available in the most recent years of the war.  According to Human Rights Watch “In 2006, 
at least 929 Afghan civilians were killed in fighting related to the armed conflict.”194   Of 
those deaths they attributed 230 to the U.S. coalition, 116 of which were attributed to 
airstrikes.  In the following year, 2007, Human Rights Watch tallied 1,633 noncombatant 
deaths, with 321 being caused by U.S. Coalition airstrikes.195  These totals are similar to 
those put forward by the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, which put civilian deaths 
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from 2006 to 2008 at 929, 1523, and 2118, respectively.196  According to a meta-analysis by 
the Human Security Report Project, in 2009 there were 2,412 noncombatant deaths, with 596 
caused by pro-government forces (which include Afghani forces).197  Most recently the 
Afghanistan Rights Monitor, put the 2010 civilian death toll in Afghanistan at “at least 
2,421” with 512 being attributable to U.S./NATO forces.198  
 There are several points that can be made about these statistics.  First, insurgents have 
caused the majority of noncombatant deaths in Afghanistan (most of which have been 
attributed to IEDs).  Additionally, it is hard to tell what the causes of each civilian death 
attributable to U.S./NATO forces were but it is likely that as with 2006, the majority were 
caused by airstrikes.  What this data will not tell us though, is how many of these strikes took 
place after the precautions necessary for double effect to apply were followed.  There are 
some factors, however, which seem show that at least some of the civilian deaths in these 
cases were not justified according to jus in bello requirements. 
 One issue with the tactics used in Afghanistan is the reliance on indiscriminate 
weapons that pose an unnecessary risk to civilians. In a New York Times Article published 
in 2001, Eric Schmitt and James Dao boasted about the precision of U.S. weapons.  
According to Schmitt and Dao, “New guidance systems have been strapped onto older 
weapons, like the cluster bombs dropped near Kunduz, making them devastatingly 
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accurate.”199  Unfortunately, as pointed out by the Project on Defense Alternatives’ Carl 
Conetta, with the increased useage of “smart” weapons in Afghanistan (as compared to 
Kosovo), there was also a switch from laser-guided to GPS-guided weapons.  According to 
Conetta, “Most current GPS directed weapons, such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition 
(JDAM), are simply less accurate than laser-guided bombs.”200  The difference, between the 
accuracy of laser and GPS guided weapons does seem to only be several meters, but when 
targeting houses, as is often done in Afghanistan, this can certainly be the difference between 
a successful attack and a slaughter of innocent civilians.   
In addition to the use of GPS guided munitions, the U.S. has, at least at times, used 
cluster bombs.  According to the Afghanistan Rights Monitor, 
 
Cluster munitions are large weapons which are deployed from 
the air and ground and release dozens or hundreds of smaller 
submunitions also called “bomblets,” or “grenades” which pose 
two main risks to civilians.  First, their widespread dispersal 
means they cannot distinguish between military targets and 
civilians so the humanitarian impact can be extreme, especially 
when the weapon is used in or near populated areas. 
 
Additionally, cluster submunitions often fail to detonate.  These “dud” submunitions can be 
very unstable and so are very dangerous to people in the area that may step on them (which is 
relatively easy since submunitions are often between the size of a baseball and a football.)   
 When it comes to cluster bombs, it seems that their use should be stopped completely.  
The danger they pose to civilians is a direct violation of the due care called for in the criteria 
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for the use of double effect.  Additionally, the use of other weapons should be restricted to 
the most accurate and least damaging weapons that can carry out the missions.  Often 
weapons like the JDAM are used when they do not have to be.  For example, while I was 
deployed to Iraq, the military would often use JDAMs to destroy houses that were likely 
rigged with explosives.  As explosive ordnance disposal technicians, my team and I were 
qualified to go into these houses and disarm any explosive devices by hand.  Of course, 
doing so would have put my team and I at risk, but that is a necessary risk if due care is to be 
taken.   
Another example of JDAMs being used when alternative means were available was in 
Baquba Iraq, in spring of 2008.  Several industrial chlorine tanks had been left in a field and 
instead of disposing of them properly the military decided to drop JDAMs on them.  In this 
case it was American troops and not civilians who were harmed because the tanks were not 
destroyed but only damaged and the chlorine gas from the tanks was carried downwind, 
leaving several soldiers in need of immediate medical treatment.  Certainly, had the wind 
been blowing in a different direction (it seems that in this case there was no attention paid to 
the wind direction), a nearby town full of civilians could have been exposed to chlorine gas.  
It is this type of carelessness and lack of precaution in combat that leads to immoral civilian 
death.  When alternative means are available which can carry out the mission and have less 
potential for civilian death they must be used if the civilian right to life is to be protected.  
Besides these specific types of weapons and their overuse there is another issue regarding 
when and how often airstrikes are used.    
 The war in Afghanistan has been different than many previous wars in the small 
number of troops dedicated to carrying out its operations.  Instead of using large units to go 
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after insurgents, the idea was to use technology and special operations forces.  The result has 
been that airstrikes have often been unplanned.  As was discussed earlier in this section, to 
carry out an attack there is a level of care that must be taken in order to satisfy the duty not to 
interfere with the civilian right to life.  However, in instances where airstrikes are unplanned 
(for example, the lightly armed special forces teams often call in air support when they come 
under fire), the care that can be taken with planning is no longer possible.  In a report by 
Human Rights Watch called “‘Troops In Contact’ Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in 
Afghanistan,” they explain that 
Whether civilian casualties result from aerial bombing in 
Afghanistan seems to depend more than anything else on 
whether the airstrike was planned or was an unplanned strike in 
rapid response to an evolving military situation on the ground. 
When aerial bombing is planned, mostly against suspected 
Taliban targets, US and NATO forces in Afghanistan have had a 
very good record of minimizing harm to civilians. In 2008, no 
planned airstrikes appear to have resulted in civilian casualties. 
In 2007, it appears that only one planned airstrike resulted in 
civilian casualties. In 2006, at least one attack resulting in 
civilian deaths may have been a planned attack.201 
 
The war in Afghanistan has been fought, or at least had been for the past few years with an 
astoundingly low number of troops for the size of the country and population.  The following 
chart shows the number of American troops deployed to Afghanistan throughout the course 
of the war:202 
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As can be seen in this chart from the Brookings Institute, for the first six years of the war in 
Afghanistan, the United States dedicated less that 25,000 troops.  Similarly, the 48 other 
countries that have dedicated troops to the U.S./NATO coalition deployed a total of 10,500 
or less troops through June of 2006.203  Meanwhile, the midyear population of Afghanistan in 
2002 was 23,051,000.204  If we focus, for example, on November of 2002, there were 9,500 
U.S. troops and 9,400 Non-U.S. Coalition troops in Afghanistan, meaning that for every 
troop deployed to Afghanistan there were 1,219 Afghans.  Besides the fact that large 
numbers of those troops were not combat troops (every military unit depends on a support 
structure made up of other troops, for example, administrative and logistical support troops), 
the sheer size of the Afghan population meant that providing a reasonable level of safety for 
the civilian portion of the population would be almost impossible.  Of course, I am not 
claiming that the force deployed to a foreign country in a war has to be large enough to 
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provide absolute protection to the civilian population against harm from the enemy.  What I 
am claiming, though, is that the force must be large enough so that unplanned airstrikes do 
not serve as the primary response to attacks on friendly forces.  In other words, if a war is to 
be fought morally, it will require a large enough force.  The war in Afghanistan has not, until 
more recently, received a force even relatively near adequate to carry out this task and so the 
War in Afghanistan has largely been fought immorally.  Before completely condemning 
actions in the war, though, I would like to point out a few of the American effort’s saving 
graces. 
 First, it seems that what civilian deaths Americans have caused in Afghanistan have 
mostly been unintentional.  What has been missing in Afghanistan, as compared to other 
wars, are intentional massacres of civilians.  Vietnam, for example, was full of terrible 
instances, such as the My Lai Massacre in which American troops intentionally slaughtered 
somewhere over 300 civilians.205  Likewise, the heavy aerial bombardment that intentionally 
killed civilians in World War II has not been present either.  Secondly, the U.S. has more 
recently been taking steps to make it clear that airstrikes should not be used except in 
instances where they absolutely must be.  In a new Tactical Directive released in 2010, 
General Patraeus wrote that  
Prior to the use of fires, the commander approving the strike 
must determine that no civilians are present.  If unable to assess 
the risk of civilian presence, fires are prohibited, except under 
one of the following two conditions…206 
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Unfortunately, these conditions are classified and so we cannot evaluate whether they are 
sufficient to warrant not taking further steps to ensure civilian safety before attacking.   
Furthermore, these directives have come out much too far into the war to have prevented a 
lot of civilian death that could have been avoided.  Finally, the amount of troops needed to 
fight the war in a more just manner is now being dedicated.  Nearly ten years into the war 
there are more than 140,000 Coalition troops in Afghanistan207 and the administration is 
finally beginning to take responsibility in situations where civilians are killed because of a 
lack of due care.208  It is safe to say then, that while the war in Afghanistan has not been 
fought in a completely just manner it has been fought in a more just, or less unjust manner 
than many previous wars and is improving, despite the war being carried on for nearly 10 
years.  Unfortunately, there is one more major problem with the war in Afghanistan, but this 
has to do not with how it is being fought but with what is being done with enemy combatants 





 In Section II of this paper the distinctions between the crime and war paradigms were 
outlined.  It was clear then, that the war paradigm requires that once an enemy combatant is 
captured, whether that be as a result of injury or surrender, they take on the status of a 
prisoner of war.  Earlier in this section, it was explained that although combatants largely 
sacrifice their right to life, they do enjoy a new set of rights in exchange.  Amongst these 
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rights, some of which are laid out in the Geneva Conventions, are the rights to medical care, 
humane treatment, and repatriation at the end of hostilities.209  As a matter of both 
international norms and morality, once an enemy combatant is captured they can no longer 
be treated as a combatant.  They are neither subject to punishment (unless they have 
committed war crimes) nor torture.  If it is the case that a combatant has committed war 
crimes, they are to be allowed a fair trial.  The reason for this is that while following the war 
paradigm, soldiers are allowed (and expected) to kill enemy combatants and in turn enemy 
combatants can (according to international norms) fight back, assuming they are using 
legitimate means of fighting.  That being the case, we cannot, after trying to kill enemy 
combatants, capture them and treat them as though their fighting back was a crime.  In other 
words, as pointed out by George Washington University Professor David Luban, “It is 
impermissible to punish him [a combatant] for his role in fighting the war.  Nor can he be 
harshly interrogated after he is captured.”210  Unfortunately, in Afghanistan, the U.S. has 
largely disregarded these norms and uniformly treated enemy combatants who are captured 
as criminals, no matter what their actions were in the war. 
 In an essay by Vincent-Joel Proulx, a law clerk at the International Court of Justice in 
the Hague, “In mounting Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States was adamant in 
expounding that Taliban members would be stripped of prisoner of war (‘POW’) status, 
while it also claimed that members of the Al Qaeda network would not benefit from the 
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protection of the Geneva Conventions.”211  In an announcement by Press Secretary Ari 
Fleischer on February 7, 2002 he explained that  
 
…President Bush today has decided that the Geneva Convention 
will apply to the Taliban detainees, but not to the al Qaeda 
international terrorists…. Under Article 4 of the Geneva 
Convention, however, Taliban detainees are not entitled to POW 
status. To qualify as POWs under Article 4, al Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees would have to have satisfied four conditions: 
They would have to be part of a military hierarchy; they would 
have to have worn uniforms or other distinctive signs visible at 
a distance; they would have to have carried arms openly; and 
they would have to have conducted their military operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war.212 
 
In other words, the Bush administration had made it a crime, to fight against the U.S. in 
Operation Enduring Freedom, combining both the war and crime paradigms.  This new 
hybrid model stripped all human rights from the enemy forces by allowing that we try to kill 
them according to the war model (in which combatants largely lose their right to life) and 
then indefinitely detain them (as criminals without any prisoner of war rights) and torture 
them, in direct violation of the Geneva Conventions.213 
 The implications of the Bush administration’s decision to uniformly deny the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda forces prisoner of war statuses were significant.  The decision denied the 
opposing forces of any of the rights allowed by the war or crime paradigms, while 
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simultaneously allowing the administration the benefits of both paradigms: Not only could 
we now kill the opposing forces, but we could also treat them as criminals if they were 
captured. Yet, the basis for doing so, especially in the case of the Taliban, was extremely 
flimsy. 
 As pointed out by Press Secretary Fleischer, according to the Geneva Conventions 
there are several requirements that must be followed for combatants to be protected, amongst 
which are the requirements to be distinguishable from civilians and to fight according to the 
laws of war.  When it comes to being distinguishable from civilians, it is not completely 
clear that all of the Taliban forces violated this rule.  First of all, it may have been the case, 
at least in some instances, that some of the Taliban were distinguishable by their black 
turbans, carrying of weapons, or possibly by their uniform maintenance of beards.   
Additionally, although this does not justify any lack of distinction on the part of the Taliban, 
U.S. forces have a habit of using civilian attire and sterile uniforms in combat themselves, 
but expect that they are protected by the Geneva Conventions.  The point, here, is not that the 
administration was wrong in denying Taliban members protection under the Geneva 
Convention due to their lack of distinction in all cases (or even any case), but that a uniform 
designation of this sort is not justified.  It may be that some of the Taliban fought within the 
criteria of the Geneva conventions and so should have been afforded its protections.  In an 
article for the American Journal of International Law, George H. Aldrich explained how the 
administration should have dealt with the issue of the enemy forces not distinguishing 
themselves from civilians: 
 
I would suggest that a necessary first step would be for the 
United States to make public both the basis and the reason for 
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denying POW status to all Taliban prisoners, not simply by 
asserting that the Taliban armed forces neither distinguished 
themselves adequately from the civilian population nor 
conducted their military operations in accordance with the laws 
of war, but by documenting such assertions and accompanying 
this evidence with a convincing explanation of the gravity of 
these matters and some elaboration of the evidently felt need to 
deprive them of POW status.214    
 
The real issue here is that the administration has attempted to treat all enemy combatants as 
war criminals.  Yet, not distinguishing oneself is not sufficient for being labeled as such.  To 
be a war criminal, and sacrifice prisoner of war status rights, one must actually commit a war 
crime.215  In this case a combatant must not only not distinguish himself but must carry out 
an attack simultaneously.  If that were not the case then it would be a near impossibility for 
any combatant, on either side, to keep prisoner of war status if captured.  In other words, to 
claim that a combatant loses prisoner of war status as soon as they fail to distinguish 
themselves would prevent combatants from ever removing their uniform in a combat zone 
(for example, while returning to base, since there are almost always civilians present on a 
base).  Furthermore, although it may be possible that no enemy combatant distinguished 
himself from civilians in OEF, there should be an investigation done into each case to see 
whether they had simultaneously performed hostile actions.  If a combatant has not, then they 
have done nothing to sacrifice their rights as a captured combatant.  In order to protect the 
rights of combatants, it should certainly be the case that everyone captured is given prisoner 
of war status if there is doubt about whether they qualify.216  Only after an investigation 
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should a combatant’s war rights be revoked, and that is after it has been shown that they are a 
war criminal. 
 It is not the denial of prisoner of war status to those captured in Afghanistan, though, 
that has been the worst moral issue with hybridization.  Far worse has been the fact that 
prisoners have been tortured at the hands of Americans.  Once captured, the enemy forces 
should be detained until hostilities have ended and then repatriated.  In the meantime they 
should be held in conditions that respect their rights as human beings.  This does not mean, 
however, that there are not many detainees that should be punished.  When it is found that 
there is sufficient evidence to try a detainee before a military commission for violation of the 
rules of war that is what should be done.  Maintaining this restriction on punishing only those 
who have violated the rules of war means maintaining the distinction of the crime and war 
paradigms and respects the basic rights that must be accounted for if American actions are to 
be just. 
 Finally, there have been some who have objected to the detention of combatants who 
are captured until the end of hostilities on the grounds that the war on terror can have no 
identifiable end.  As Luban points out, “In the War on Terrorism, no capitulation is possible.  
That means that the real aim of the war is, quite simply, to kill or capture all of the 
terrorists—to keep on killing and killing, capturing and capturing, until they are all gone.”217  
What can be said in response to this claim is that the war in Afghanistan must specifically be 
looked at as that, a war within a specific country, against specific forces: the Taliban and Al 
Qaida in Afghanistan.  What relationship there is between the other aspects of the War on 
Terrorism (Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaida in Iraq, etc…) must be looked at as 
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related but not one and the same conflict.  Those who are captured within Afghanistan can, 






 After reviewing the U.S. response to 9/11 through what has largely been a war 
paradigm with some elements of the crime paradigm intermingled, there are many lessons to 
be learned.  As was pointed out, in Section III, the President is largely free to respond to acts 
of terrorism through a war paradigm.  Additionally, one form of guidance in instances where 
a war paradigm is chosen should be ethical considerations.   
 As was discovered in this section, Operation Iraqi Freedom was an unjust war for its 
violations of the principles of jus ad bellum.  In contrast, Operation Enduring Freedom has 
been a just war according to jus ad bellum, but has violated some of the requirements of  jus 
in bello.  However, in comparison to most other wars, OEF has been less unjust, and the 
efforts of the U.S./NATO have done far less to violate human rights than the actions of the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda. 
 If the U.S. was to respond to a future terrorist attack through the war paradigm I 
would make several suggestions in order for the war to come closer to the ideal of a just war.  
First, the U.S. should dedicate a large number of troops and should also try to have as much 
international cooperation as possible to provide security for the civilian population and avoid 
an immoral overreliance on unplanned airstrikes.  A side note to this point is that dedicating 
a large enough force may very possibly help to avoid unnecessarily long conflicts.  As was 
pointed out in a study by the RAND organization, a minimum soldier to population ratio of 
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twenty soldiers for every thousand citizens is required for successful stability operations.218  
With a similar line of thought, Colin Powell has formulated what has come to be known as 
the Powell Docrtine: “military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is 
a clear risk to national security by the intended target; the force, when used, should be 
overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy; there must be strong 
support for the campaign by the general public; and there must be a clear exit strategy from 
the conflict in which the military is engaged.”219  Whether following the RAND 
recommendation or the Powell Doctrine would lead to a military victory is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  What can be said, though, is that sticking to such standards would make it 
more likely that a war can and would be fought justly. 
The U.S. response to 9/11 in OIF and OEF has been constitutionally sound but not 
completely ethical according to a just war analysis.  The major downfall of Operation 
Enduring Freedom has been the back end inclusion of the punishment elements of the crime 
paradigm.  In future conflicts, in order for a war to be conducted justly it must strictly stay 
within the confines of the war paradigm.  That said, although the U.S. response to 9/11 
through Operation Enduring Freedom has not been completely just, it has been better than 
most wars, and through stricter adherence to the principles of Just War Theory, it may be 
possible for future counter-terror wars to be just. 
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